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  The text, structure, and history of the Intellectual Property Clause 
(IP Clause), as well as subsequent governmental activity, Supreme 
Court doctrine, and policy, show that the IP Clause limits Congress 
from using any of its other powers “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts” through laws that reach beyond the power 
conferred by the IP Clause to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” That is, the evidence marshaled by this Article shows 
that the IP Clause externally limits Congress from seeking, via 
legislation, to promote the progress of science and useful arts, in any 
way other than by enacting laws that secure to authors and inventors 
exclusive rights in their writings and discoveries for limited times. Yet 
the story of Congress’s power in this area has another side: Since the 
late twentieth century, Congress has increasingly reached beyond the 
IP Clause’s means to promote the Clause’s ends, often asserting its 
expansive—and less limited—commerce and treaty powers. To some 
degree, this shift reflects the fact that laws regulating intellectual 
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property often have multiple purposes, including trade and foreign-
relations interests, which sometimes point in more expansive 
directions than do those of the more limited IP Clause. This Article 
synthesizes these competing purposes and provides an analytical 
framework under which courts, legislators, and others can assess the 
constitutionality of federal legislation. This framework affords a 
presumption against the constitutionality of laws that promote the IP 
Clause’s ends but subvert its means, a presumption that may be 
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that Congress, 
pursuant to its other more permissive powers, intentionally chose to 
supersede the IP Clause’s means because of paramount, legitimate 
interests. This framework suggests that a number of existing federal 
laws, such as federal trade-secrecy provisions and antibootlegging 
laws, might be unconstitutional. The framework also suggests how to 
assess the constitutionality of laws that would protect databases, laws 
passed pursuant to international agreements with other countries, and 
laws that establish federal funding for scientific and artistic works. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Could Congress enact perpetual copyright or patent protection? 
Could it grant copyright or patent rights to an entity other than a 
work’s author or inventor, respectively? Could it protect against the 
copying of works that are not fixed in a tangible medium? A look at 
the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause (IP Clause) alone 
suggests a probable-to-definite no to each of these questions. The IP 
Clause empowers Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 
The power contemplated by the IP Clause, however, is not the 
only power that the Constitution confers on Congress. Most 
expansively, the Constitution also enables Congress, under the 
Commerce Clause, “To regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States.”2 Moreover, the Constitution grants Congress authority to 
spend money in certain ways to “provide for the . . . general Welfare 
of the United States”3 and to “make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution” the federal government’s 
enumerated powers.4 The Constitution also grants one house of 
Congress, the Senate, a considerable role in treatymaking.5 To the 
extent that congressional action fails to conform to the requirements 
of the IP Clause, then, could Congress nevertheless define or regulate 
rights in intellectual property by enacting any of the aforementioned 
expansive laws under these other powers? 
This Article relies on the text, structure, and history of the IP 
Clause, as well as subsequent governmental activity, Supreme Court 
doctrine, and policy, to show that the IP Clause is set up to limit 
Congress from using any of its other Article I powers “To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts” through laws that would 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. As a term, “the IP Clause” is inaccurate in at least two 
ways: neither the term “intellectual property” nor its abbreviation appears in the Clause itself, 
and the term encompasses trademark law, which is outside the Clause’s scope. Dotan Oliar, 
Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on 
Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1773 n.1 (2006); Edward C. 
Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 
HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 81 (1995); see also infra text accompanying notes 131–38. 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 3. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 4. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 5. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur . . . .”). 
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reach beyond the scope of the power conferred by the IP Clause to 
“secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”6 The evidence 
marshaled by this Article shows that if Congress seeks, via legislation, 
to promote the progress of science and useful arts, the only way it 
may do so is by enacting laws that secure to authors and inventors 
exclusive rights in their writings and discoveries for limited times. 
The IP Clause’s text and placement within the constitutional 
structure suggest that Congress possesses power to pursue the goal of 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts, but only by using 
the means specified by the Clause itself: namely, securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries. Additionally, the IP Clause’s history 
indicates that Congress cannot use other means to promote the 
specified end of promoting the progress of science and useful arts. For 
one thing, the Framers rejected other possible means of achieving this 
end, such as the ability to award grants and prizes.7 This choice 
implies that the Framers intended for Congress to use only the means 
explicitly identified in the Clause to achieve the Clause’s ends. 
Congress’s refusal in its earliest years to enact certain laws that would 
have sought to promote the progress of science and useful arts 
through means other than those laid out in the IP Clause—even 
means allotted to Congress by other constitutional provisions, such as 
the Commerce Clause—further confirms this understanding.8 
Although the Supreme Court has never directly confronted the 
limitations that the IP Clause might impose on Congress’s other 
powers, its jurisprudence on the IP Clause, as well as its general 
understanding of clashes between two constitutional provisions, 
supports this interpretation.9 Finally, the policy embedded in the IP 
Clause of maintaining a careful balance between intellectual-property 
rights for creators on the one hand and the broader public benefit on 
the other demands that Congress not upset this balance by resorting 
to its other powers to further the IP Clause’s ends.10 
 
 6. I explore the implications of this Article’s analysis for preemption of state laws in 
Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012).  
 7. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 8. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 9. See infra Part I.C. 
 10. See infra Part I.D. 
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In all, the evidence to which courts and scholars normally turn to 
interpret and construe the Constitution suggests that the IP Clause 
externally limits Congress from using its other powers to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts in ways that go beyond the IP 
Clause’s means. 
That said, there is a competing side to the story of Congress’s 
power in this area. Congress can sometimes have legitimate interests 
in enacting laws that promote the progress of science and useful arts 
that extend beyond the IP Clause’s means. For one thing, the 
Commerce Clause’s reach has grown greatly since the United States’ 
early years.11 The Commerce Clause can reasonably be understood to 
extend to intellectual goods traditionally governed by the IP Clause 
because of those goods’ use in commerce. Alternatively, globalization 
has led to the escalating use of treaties and other foreign agreements 
to govern intellectual property. Congress might view commerce or 
trade interests or foreign-relations concerns as distinct from the 
concerns of the IP Clause and thus as requiring the employment of 
means other than those specified in the IP Clause. Any theory of the 
extent of Congress’s power to regulate in the area of intellectual 
property ought to address the fact that Congress might not be 
concerned merely with promoting the progress of science and useful 
arts, but also, for example, with promoting commerce or foreign 
relations. 
These competing considerations give rise to an analytical 
framework under which courts, legislators, and others can assess the 
constitutionality of federal legislation. As a general matter, when 
legislation has the structural purpose of promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts, it must restrict itself to the means specified in 
the IP Clause. But with respect to laws that have multiple 
constitutional purposes, there ought to be a presumption against the 
constitutionality of laws that promote the IP Clause’s ends but 
subvert its means, a presumption that may be overcome only by clear 
and convincing evidence that Congress, pursuant to its other more 
permissive powers, intentionally chose to supersede the IP Clause’s 
means because of paramount, legitimate interests. This presumption 
ought to be significantly harder to overcome when a law’s chosen 
means interfere with the IP Clause’s means instead of merely 
diverging from the means included in the IP Clause. This framework 
suggests that a number of modern federal laws, such as the trade-
 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 233–36. 
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secrecy laws and antibootlegging laws, might be unconstitutional. The 
framework also demonstrates how to assess the constitutionality of 
laws that would protect databases, laws passed pursuant to 
international agreements, and laws that establish federal funding for 
scientific and artistic works. Because Congress, since the late 
twentieth century, has increasingly been legislating at or beyond this 
constitutional boundary, having a framework with which to assess the 
constitutionality of certain laws at the outer margins is increasingly 
important. 
This Article’s proposed framework is different from analyses set 
out by previous works. Professor Thomas Nachbar, for instance, 
maintains that the IP Clause does not limit Congress’s other powers.12 
I disagree. 
Other scholars focus on the internal limitations of the IP Clause. 
For example, Professor Lawrence Solum maintains that the Clause is 
characterized by a unique means-end structure that constrains the 
granted power.13 Professor Dotan Oliar similarly argues that 
restrictions inhere in the IP Clause—specifically, that the IP Clause 
allows Congress to enact intellectual-property laws only if they 
promote the progress of science and useful arts—but does not push 
further to understand how the IP Clause’s boundaries might or might 
not limit Congress’s other powers.14 Given the expansiveness of 
 
 12. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 272 (2004) (“The Intellectual Property Clause and its limits do not represent generally 
applicable constitutional norms and Congress may therefore legislate pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause without regard to the Intellectual Property Clause or its limits.”); cf. Edward 
C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective 
(pt. 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 763 (2001) [hereinafter Walterscheid, IP Clause] 
(arguing that the IP Clause “provides a broader scope of authority to Congress than merely the 
power to create patents and copyrights, while at the same time [containing] limitations on the 
patent and copyright power that are only in recent years coming to be understood”); Edward C. 
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a 
Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1 (2002) [hereinafter Walterscheid, To Promote] (maintaining 
that the IP Clause’s “‘by securing’ language is intended as an explanation of the generic grant of 
power set forth in the ‘to promote’ language as specifically including authority regarding patents 
and copyrights,” but that “there are both express and inherent limitations in the Clause taken as 
a whole which qualify and limit the patent and copyright power of Congress[,] . . . . [and that i]n 
particular, the introductory language ‘to promote’ restrains such power”).  
 13. Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power To Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002). 
 14. See Oliar, supra note 1, at 1822, 1824–45 (focusing on the policy implications of 
understanding the first half of the IP Clause as limiting Congress’s authority to enact laws that 
in actuality promote the progress of science and useful arts, and considering how courts might 
enforce that restriction); see also Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New 
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Congress’s other powers, such as the powers conveyed by the 
Commerce and Spending Clauses, this question is even more critical 
than the question of the IP Clause’s internal meaning alone. 
Some works propose that the IP Clause restrains Congress’s 
other powers. These works, however, tend to be undertheorized, do 
not extend as far as my analysis does, or suggest a complex analysis. 
The recurring suggestion that the IP Clause’s specific power limits 
more general powers elsewhere in the Constitution is 
undertheorized.15 In an in-depth analysis, Professor Yochai Benkler 
extrapolates from some Supreme Court decisions and builds on policy 
to read the IP Clause’s grant of power as limiting Congress to 
granting exclusive rights in information only when that information 
makes an “original contribution[] to the wealth of human knowledge” 
not already in the public domain.16 Similarly, former Professor 
William Patry reads the IP Clause as preventing Congress from 
undermining the public’s right to copy unoriginal material.17 My 
analysis suggests going further in some ways and less far in others. 
Professors Paul Heald and Suzanna Sherry perceive a complex 
constellation of principles in the IP Clause that tie Congress’s hands 
in enacting other legislation. In their view, the IP Clause is the only 
relevant power with respect to “legislation that imposes monopoly-
like costs on the public through the granting of exclusive rights,” and 
any law passed under it must, in exchange for granting a right to a 
contribution’s creator, provide a new contribution to the public, in the 
 
Reading, 57 UCLA L. REV. 421, 423 (2009) (characterizing his own previous work on the IP 
Clause as “ma[king] one major argument”: that“[t]he Framers intended the progress language 
in the Clause—‘to promote the progress of science and useful art’—to limit Congress’s power to 
grant IP rights”).  
 15. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s Approach to Information Products: 
Muscling Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. CT. 
REV. 195, 230 (“Restrictions on constitutional grants of legislative power, such as the Copyright 
Clause, would be meaningless if Congress could evade them simply by announcing that it was 
acting under some broader authority.”); Malla Pollack, The Right To Know?: Delimiting 
Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, 
and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 60 (1999) (“Accepting that 
Congress may not do an end run around a limitation in one clause of the Constitution by 
invoking a more general clause, Congress may not grant (at least some types of) exclusive rights 
to something close to, but not quite, the writings of authors or the discoveries of inventors.”). 
 16. Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial 
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
535, 538–46 (2000). 
 17. William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An 
Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 364–66 (1999). 
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form of access to the work presently and free access eventually when 
it enters the public domain.18 
Part I uses the IP Clause’s structure, text, history, judicial 
doctrine, and policy to build the case that the Clause ought to be 
understood as both a grant of limited power and a limitation on 
Congress’s authority to use its other enumerated powers to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts by means other than those 
specified in the Clause. Part II uses this evidence to construct a 
framework for assessing the constitutionality of legislation and 
suggests how to evaluate the potential conflicts that might arise 
between the IP Clause power and other constitutional powers, most 
notably the commerce, spending, necessary-and-proper, and treaty 
powers. This Part incorporates the insight that a law regulating 
intellectual property might have multiple legitimate constitutional 
purposes. Part III builds on this framework to suggest that a number 
of existing and potential federal laws are of questionable 
constitutionality. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING THE IP CLAUSE 
Most scholars and courts that have examined the IP Clause have 
dwelled on whether the first half of the Clause—“To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts”—is a restraint on Congress’s 
authority to enact intellectual-property laws. That is, can Congress 
enact intellectual-property laws if they do not, in actuality, promote 
this progress? For example, both Justice Breyer and Professor Oliar 
rely on history, constitutional structure, and policy considerations to 
conclude that the progress provision is an independent restriction.19 
 
 18. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 
1160 (emphasis omitted). 
 19. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242–67 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the IP Clause limits congressional power based on the history and text of the IP 
Clause and policy considerations); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE 
COMMONS OF THE MIND 170, 208, 210 (2008) (arguing, after considering the constitutional text, 
“Jeffersonian ideals,” and policy concerns, that the IP Clause limits congressional power); 
WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 123 (2009) (“The Constitution 
is quite clear that Congress can only grant copyright to promote the progress of science, and 
thus this ‘burden’ exists from the inception of the rights, and follows those rights for the 
duration of the copyright.”); Oliar, supra note 1, at 1772–73, 1778–79 (arguing, after considering 
the Framers’ intent, that the IP Clause limits congressional power); Malla Pollack, What Is 
Congress Supposed To Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 770–71 
(2001) (reasoning that Congress cannot use its Commerce Clause powers to enact intellectual-
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This particular line of research focuses chiefly on the IP Clause’s 
internal limits, not on its external limits—in other words, whether the 
Clause limits Congress’s other powers. Such scholarship is compatible 
with this Article’s analytical framework, but it ultimately falls outside 
of this Article’s scope. 
This Article understands the IP Clause’s first part as a purposive 
channeling mechanism. That is, if Congress desires to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, it may do so only by awarding to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right in their writings and 
discoveries for limited times. Moreover, Congress may not use its 
other enumerated powers to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts by using means other than those specified in the IP Clause. 
In this way, the IP Clause externally limits Congress’s other powers. 
As I discuss in this Part, text, history, constitutional structure, 
Supreme Court doctrine, and policy strongly support this 
understanding. 
Others have concluded otherwise. According to Professor 
Nachbar, the Constitution does not restrain Congress from enacting 
laws that do not conform to the IP Clause’s specified means.20 He 
states that no good evidence—historical or otherwise—supports the 
proposition that the IP Clause was intended to limit Congress’s other 
powers, such as its powers under the far-reaching Commerce Clause.21 
Nachbar asserts that the IP Clause was not much debated at the 
Constitutional Convention and that it is “a relatively insignificant 
form of economic regulation allocating quasi-property rights between 
private entities.”22 Therefore, he sees the IP Clause as being far from 
a central structural concept in the constitutional framework.23 
Moreover, Nachbar detects no constitutional norms—in either the IP 
 
property protection that does not promote the progress of science and useful arts); Edward C. 
Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 44 IDEA 
331, 333 (2004) (“[T]he preambular argument which treats the ‘to promote’ language as a 
preamble which places little or no constraint on the legislative power of Congress is the most 
dubious and least tenable of the various interpretations that have been given to the Science and 
Useful Arts Clause.”); cf. Andrew M. Hetherington, Comment, Constitutional Purpose and 
Inter-Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 470 (2003) (arguing that the Clause’s first part serves to 
reject a natural-rights approach to intellectual property by emphasizing that the purpose of 
intellectual-property laws is utilitarian). 
 20. Nachbar, supra note 12, at 276–77. 
 21. Id. at 277. 
 22. Id. at 291. 
 23. Id. at 291–92.  
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Clause or the First Amendment—that ought to restrain Congress 
from enacting intellectual-property laws beyond the IP Clause’s 
limits, whereas he argues that Congress, as a matter of policy, ought 
to decide the IP Clause’s boundaries vis-à-vis Congress’s other 
powers.24 
Walterscheid takes a somewhat related position, although via 
another analytical route. He suggests that although the IP Clause ties 
Congress’s hands broadly by requiring that certain laws not impose 
“monopoly-like costs on the public,” among other restrictions, it also 
gives Congress power to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts by various means, including but not limited to the copyright and 
patent powers described in the Clause.25 
This Part disagrees by showing that the IP Clause externally 
limits Congress’s other powers. The following sections in turn analyze 
the Clause’s text, structure, and history, as well as Supreme Court 
doctrine and policy, to make the case. 
A. Text and Structure 
The U.S. Constitution confers upon Congress power “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”26 To understand the IP Clause’s 
reach, one should first examine this text and its surrounding 
constitutional structure. As Professor Laurence Tribe explains, 
“[A]ny ‘interpretation’ of a constitutional term or provision must at 
least seriously address the entire text out of which a particular 
fragment has been selected for interpretation, and must at least take 
seriously the architecture of the institutions that the text defines.”27 
This examination, although not conclusive, suggests a clause that 
allows Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts 
 
 24. Id. at 318, 344. According to Professor Nachbar, the First Amendment limits 
congressional power under the IP Clause, but it does not thereby impose external limits on 
Congress’s other powers. Id. at 319–20. But see Steven J. Horowitz, A Free Speech Theory of 
Copyright, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, ¶ 3 (arguing that the Copyright Clause’s limits are free-
speech limits and are thus enforceable as individual rights). My approach is consistent with 
either view of the First Amendment.  
 25. Walterscheid, To Promote, supra note 12, at 79–80; see also Walterscheid, IP Clause, 
supra note 12, at 767–68. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 27. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1233 (1995) (emphasis 
omitted).  
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only by the means specified in the Clause, even if Congress might 
otherwise assert another textual source of authority for its action. 
Some view the first part of the IP Clause as nothing more than a 
nonbinding preamble.28 This interpretation cannot be correct. For one 
thing, it requires reading the first half both unnaturally and as a 
nullity, contrary to the basic rule of construction that every word of 
the Constitution must be given meaning.29 This construction also 
confers a different grammatical understanding on the IP Clause than 
on the other Article I, Section 8 powers. As James Monroe long ago 
observed, each of the enumerated powers listed in Article I, Section 8 
begins with a grant of power.30 Read correctly, the IP Clause fits this 
scheme because, like all of the other enumerated powers, the first 
part of the Clause begins with a “To,” followed by the power that is 
being granted.31 
In another way, however, the IP Clause is structured differently 
from the other Article I, Section 8 powers. It is the only clause that 
specifies the means for carrying out the allotted power:32 “by securing 
 
 28. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] 
(2011) (“[T]he phrase ‘To promote the progress of science and useful arts . . .’ must be read as 
largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not in limitation of 
its exercise.” (omission in original) (footnotes omitted)).  
 29. See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 1, at 1787 (“The last justification for the limiting operation of 
the Progress Clause has been to use the general interpretive presumption according to which 
each and every word and phrase in the Constitution should be given meaning. Some argued that 
interpreting the Progress Clause as a non-binding preambular statement of purpose would 
render it meaningless and thus should be rejected.” (footnote omitted)); Solum, supra note 13, 
at 22 (“Given the plain language of the Intellectual Property Clause and the structure of Article 
I, Section 8, the notion that the Clause consists of a preamble followed by a power grant is 
simply unsustainable.”); Hetherington, supra note 19, at 465 (“[I]t seems strange that the power 
to promote progress would be mentioned at all, unless it was intended as a purposive element in 
the clause.”).  
 30. James Monroe, Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal 
Improvements (May 4, 1822), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 144, 163 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).  
 31. Solum, supra note 13, at 13–20; see also Walterscheid, IP Clause, supra note 12, at 767 
(“The clause is . . . treated as though the grant of power is: ‘To secure for limited times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’ . . . A 
major disadvantage is that this is not literally the language of the clause, and such interpretation 
renders its grammatical construction quite different than that afforded to every other 
enumerated congressional power.”). 
 32. Solum, supra note 13, at 19–20; Walterscheid, IP Clause, supra note 12, at 774–75. The 
Militia Clause has a related structure: it confers upon Congress power “To provide for calling 
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. Professor Lawrence Solum understands this Clause to enable 
Congress to execute the Union’s laws, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions by calling forth 
the militia. Solum, supra note 13, at 19. Unlike the IP Clause, this Clause’s placement of means 
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for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The natural reading of 
this clause, given its unique structure, is that Congress has the power 
to promote the progress of science and useful arts using solely the 
specified means.33 The word “by,” preceded by a comma, links the 
first part of the Clause to the second part, suggesting a means-end 
relationship between the two.34 By comparison, consider two typically 
structured clauses in Article I, Section 8, both of which lack any 
description of the means by which Congress is to achieve the 
identified ends: the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress power 
“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes,”35 and the Postal Clause, which 
gives Congress authority “To establish Post Offices and post 
Roads.”36 
As the Supreme Court indicated during its constitutional 
interpretation in Marbury v. Madison,37 “[a]ffirmative words are 
often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those 
affirmed.”38 Legal scholars have long pointed out how the 
Constitution achieved exactly this effect by enumerating only certain 
federal powers.39 Similar limitations arguably exist elsewhere in 
Article I, Section 8, such as in the provision granting Congress power 
to raise and support armies, but with no appropriation of money 
 
before ends carries no suggestion that Congress may not use its other powers to execute the 
nation’s laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. Cf. id. at 20 (“Unlike the second 
Militia Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause grants the power to pursue a goal and then 
qualifies that power by specifying the permissible means.”). Were the IP Clause to have the 
same structure as the Militia Clause, by providing Congress power “to secure for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” it would not carry the same textual 
implication—that the Clause’s goals may be promoted only through one specified avenue. See 
id. (“The alternative [to the IP Clause’s structure] would be a power to employ any means that 
furthered the goal, and such a power would not fit the general design of Article I, Section 8, 
which lays out a scheme of limited and enumerated powers.”).  
 33. Solum, supra note 13, at 20. 
 34. Hetherington, supra note 19, at 467. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 36. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 38. Id. at 174. Professor Malla Pollack further points out that “[n]egative implication was a 
common eighteenth century method of legal drafting.” Pollack, supra note 19, at 771 n.88 (citing 
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 32, 83, 84 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 39. E.g., 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 486–90 (1953); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original 
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 336–43 (2002). 
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lasting for more than two years; in the provision giving it power to 
establish a uniform rule of naturalization; and in the provision 
granting power to make uniform bankruptcy laws.40 As discussed in 
Section B, the historical evidence more comprehensively supports this 
means-end textual reading of the IP Clause. Together, these sections 
suggest that the IP Clause authorizes only the specified means to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts. 
Even so, might Congress use its other powers to employ different 
means to promote the progress of science and useful arts? James 
Madison—a central figure in the Constitution’s making41—believed 
that a congressional power ought to be enumerated in a separate 
provision only if it did not fall within any of the other enumerated 
powers.42 This line of thinking suggests that Congress cannot use its 
other powers to regulate intellectual property, at least with regard to 
the original understanding. 
Relatedly, some scholars argue that the IP Clause limits some of 
Congress’s other enumerated powers, most notably its Commerce 
Clause power. They reason that the IP Clause grants a more specific 
power than that provided by the Commerce Clause, and the more 
specific ought to take precedence over the more general.43 This 
reasoning, however, does not provide sufficient evidence that the IP 
 
 40. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (authorizing Congress “To raise and support Armies,” 
provided that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two 
Years”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress power “To establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States”); see also Patry, supra note 17, at 373 (“Claiming that [Clauses 4, 8, and 12] do not act as 
a limitation on Congress’s power ignores their unambiguous text and repeated Supreme Court 
opinions holding that Clause 8 is both a grant of power to Congress and a limitation on that 
power.”).  
 41. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First 
Congress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 860 (1994) (“But the man who dominated 
constitutional debate in the first House of Representatives was the man who had dominated the 
Constitutional Convention itself, James Madison.”).  
 42. Cf. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright 
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2381 
(2003) (“This constrained view of the enumerated powers would, again, suggest that for 
Madison, the Copyright Clause was a grant of power that Congress would not have possessed 
but for that grant.”).  
 43. E.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 230; Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 63 (2000); 
Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Penumbral Public Domain: Constitutional Limits on Quasi-
Copyright Legislation, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1081, 1100–03 (2008); Pollack, supra note 15, at 60; 
Joseph C. Merschman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the 
Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 
661, 664 (2002).  
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Clause externally limits Congress’s other powers. With respect to its 
interstate restriction, the Commerce Clause is a more specific power 
than the IP Clause. Applying the general-versus-specific reasoning to 
that fact, however, would lead to the incorrect conclusion that 
Congress is prohibited from using the IP Clause to regulate purely 
intrastate commerce, on the ground that such regulation would evade 
the Commerce Clause’s restriction on regulating commerce that is 
interstate, a restriction that is absent from the IP Clause.44 
By contrast, others considering the general issue of overlap 
among Article I, Section 8 powers tend to conclude that the 
enumerated powers can and do overlap. Professor Nachbar observes 
that these powers currently overlap, given the broad contemporary 
reach of the Commerce Clause, even if less overlap existed in earlier 
times: 
If one compares Section 8 as it was applied in 1789 with Section 8 as 
it is applied today, any number of its provisions have become 
superfluous. Certainly Congress could establish post offices and post 
roads today under either the commerce or spending powers, enact 
bankruptcy and naturalization statutes, fix standards for weights and 
measures, and criminalize counterfeiting of U.S. currency under the 
interstate commerce power, or even punish felonies on the high seas 
under the foreign commerce power. There is no reason to think that 
any of these powers were considered superfluous at the time, but 
they have become so. The growth of the commerce power means 
that we have to get comfortable with redundancy in Section 8.45 
Professor Jack Balkin similarly reasons that the enumerated powers 
are listed together, perhaps redundantly, in support of a larger 
principle authorizing Congress to act when the states are incompetent 
to do so individually.46 
This possibility of overlap, however, does not mean that 
Congress can use its other powers to reach beyond what seem to be 
limitations in the IP Clause. In fact, the opposite would seem to be 
 
 44. See Nachbar, supra note 12, at 313 (“That one of the Section 8 limitations must be read 
externally does not, as a matter of logic, dictate that they all must be; to so infer would lead to 
impossible results. . . . [Applying this rule] would prevent federal regulation of purely intrastate 
commercial conduct (such as sales or distribution) involving intellectual property because to 
allow such regulation would be to ‘eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of 
Congress to’ regulate commerce.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. 
Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982))).  
 45. Id. at 350 (footnotes omitted). 
 46. Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010).  
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true, textually and structurally. The reasoning embraced by Professor 
Nachbar and Professor Balkin does not seem to imply that Congress 
can inevitably do under one power what it is limited from doing under 
another; rather, it implies merely that an overlap of powers is not in 
itself forbidden. A careful reading of the text suggests that the IP 
Clause authorizes only the specified means to promote the progress 
of science and useful arts. As such, if Congress were permitted to use 
another power to implement other means to promote this progress, 
then the Clause’s means-end structure would be read out of the 
Constitution’s restrictions. Thus, a textual case exists for reading the 
Clause’s internal limitations as limiting Congress’s other powers. As 
discussed in later Sections, the Supreme Court has reasoned 
analogously in the context of Congress’s bankruptcy powers.47 Thus, 
the possibility of two different constitutional powers both conferring 
authority on Congress to take a particular action, as Professors 
Nachbar and Balkin discuss, is materially distinct from a situation in 
which one constitutional power seems to authorize action while the 
other seems to restrict or forbid it. 
Professor Nachbar nonetheless emphasizes that each of the 
Article I, Section 8 powers has express limits. He elaborates: 
Along with offenses against the law of nations, the tenth clause 
permits Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies,” but 
that power is expressly limited to felonies “committed on the high 
Seas.” Does that mean that Congress cannot punish landlubbers’ 
felonies pursuant to its commerce power? The Commerce Clause 
itself contains limitations, permitting the regulation of only foreign 
commerce, Indian commerce, or commerce “among the several 
States” . . . .48 
Nachbar goes on to suggest that the internal limitations on one power 
ought not necessarily be construed to limit other powers without 
evidence that the limitations were meant to reach beyond the power 
itself.49 Nachbar reasons that limitations on a grant of one power are 
all too easily converted into a general lack of power to legislate in 
other areas.50 Without any clear signal to make such a conversion, he 
 
 47. See infra text accompanying notes 154–62. 
 48. Nachbar, supra note 12, at 295 (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 
3, 10).  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
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continues, one should not export the IP Clause’s internal limitations 
to other enumerated powers.51 
Professor Nachbar’s argument falls short. Unlike the various 
clauses that Nachbar cites as examples to reinforce his argument, the 
unique means-end structure of the IP Clause provides a textual signal 
that Congress may not use its other powers to serve the goals of the 
IP Clause.52 Moreover, as I elaborate in subsequent Sections, early 
American history, judicial doctrine, and policy together loudly 
reinforce this signal. 
Some argue that notwithstanding the unique phrasal structure of 
the IP Clause, which suggests limitations on Congress’s power, the 
broader structure of Article I indicates otherwise. They reason that 
Section 8 contains grants of congressional legislative power, whereas 
Section 9 contains limitations.53 On this reasoning, Congress may 
invoke any power that is granted by at least one clause in Section 8 
and is not thereafter limited in Section 9.54 Thus, given that Section 9 
does not limit Congress’s authority to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts, Congress might use means authorized in powers 
outside of the IP Clause to do so. Former Professor William Patry 
rejects this argument on the basis that “the limitations in Article I, 
Section 9 are not closely related to the grants of power in Section 8; 
instead, they involve different issues, specialized issues that may or 
may not relate to Section 8, or issues that are general in nature.”55 
Under this line of reasoning, to use Section 9 to reject the possibility 
that the IP Clause limits Congress’s other powers seems 
unreasonable. 
In sum, ample textual and inferential evidence suggests that the 
IP Clause on its own permits only its specified means to achieve its 
designated end. The evidence from Article I’s broader structure, 
however, is less conclusive. All in all, the IP Clause’s text and the 
constitutional structure volunteer a suggestive—but not ironclad—
argument that the Clause’s unique construction operates externally to 
forbid Congress from using its other powers to promote the progress 
of science and useful arts beyond the means specified in the Clause. I 
 
 51. Id. at 296, 317.  
 52. See supra text accompanying notes 32–40. 
 53. See Patry, supra note 17, at 371 (presenting, although not accepting, this argument).  
 54. Cf. id.  
 55. Id. at 373 (footnotes omitted). 
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turn now to historical evidence that this understanding is the correct 
one. 
B. History 
This Section discusses the IP Clause’s adoption at the 
Constitutional Convention along with early congressional activity 
construing the Clause and its structural relationship to other 
enumerated powers. This evidence demonstrates that the IP Clause 
was intended to restrain Congress from using its other powers to 
employ means other than those in the IP Clause to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts. 
1. Constitutional Convention.  During the period in which the 
states lived under the Articles of Confederation, the infeasibility of 
states’ varying intellectual-property laws became increasingly clear. 
Three primary reasons contributed to this reality: First, different 
states would assign rights in the same or similar creations to different 
creators, or they would assign rights to the same person for the same 
creation for differing terms.56 Most famously, the steamboat patent 
was assigned in some states to John Fitch and in others to James 
Rumsey.57 These inconsistencies were both inefficient and confusing. 
Second, the protection of a creation in a single state was ineffective at 
preventing unauthorized copies of the creation in other states.58 
Finally, for the same creator to apply in each state to secure effective 
nationwide protection was uneconomical.59 James Madison voiced 
concern about the lack of uniformity in copyright laws just before the 
Constitutional Convention.60 
Thus, one should not be surprised that proposals giving the 
federal government power to create intellectual-property laws arose 
at the Convention. Eight such proposals were presented on August 
18, 1787, almost three months into the Convention, after the 
Committee of Detail had already written a first draft of the 
 
 56. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 95–100 
(1967). 
 57. Id. at 95–98. 
 58. See id. at 90 (“A single state patent could not hinder imitation in other states, of course, 
except in those cases where an offending device or its products entered the territory of the state 
granting the patent.”). 
 59. Id. at 88. 
 60. Id. at 125. 
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Constitution.61 James Madison made four proposals: First, in the 
realm of patents, Madison suggested a provision allowing Congress 
“To secure to the inventors of useful machines and implements the 
benefits thereof for a limited time.” Second, as to copyrights, he 
advocated language that would empower Congress “To secure to 
literary authors their copyrights for a limited time.” Third, in the area 
of education, he proposed a clause allowing Congress “To establish 
an University.” And fourth, he imagined a clause authorizing the 
creation of a system of grants and prizes under which Congress would 
be permitted “To encourage, by proper præmiums and provisions, the 
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.”62 Charles 
Pinckney of South Carolina proposed four similar provisions that 
would have allowed Congress to act in the same areas envisioned by 
Madison. Pinckney’s suggested language would have authorized 
Congress “To grant patents for useful inventions”; “To secure to 
Authors exclusive rights for a . . . certain time”; “To establish 
seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts & sciences”; 
and “To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the 
promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades and manufactures.”63 Not 
only were these similar proposals by Madison and Pinckney made on 
the same day,64 suggesting some coordination, but in each case, the 
four proposals were also made together, signifying a similarity of 
subject matter. 
Madison’s and Pinckney’s proposals were referred to the 
Committee of Detail, and by the end of August, they had been passed 
on to the third Committee of Eleven.65 On September 5, 1787, the 
third Committee of Eleven recommended—without any recorded 
debate—the inclusion of an IP Clause in the Constitution that would 
provide Congress with power “To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
 
 61. Oliar, supra note 1, at 1788–89. 
 62. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 554–55 (1900); see also 1 id. at 130–31. Although some scholars doubt that Madison 
proposed a patent power, Professor Dotan Oliar provides evidence that he did. Oliar, supra 
note 14, at 435–46 (“[T]he most reasonable inference . . . is that Madison proposed that 
Congress should have a patent power.”).  
 63. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 62, at 554–56; see also 
1 id. at 130–31 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 64. 3 id. at 554–55. 
 65. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 473 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911).  
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Discoveries.”66 On September 14, 1787, Madison and Pinckney 
together made a final attempt at the inclusion of a congressional 
power to establish a university,67 apparently having given up on grants 
and prizes. After rejecting this motion,68 the Convention approved the 
IP Clause on September 17, 1787, again without recorded debate.69 
The negligible discussion of the IP Clause in the Federalist Papers 
sheds little further light on the Clause.70 
Despite the near-silent treatment given to the IP Clause in the 
Convention’s records,71 in reworking the eight proposals into their 
final form, the Framers made a number of choices that strongly 
suggest the IP Clause’s intended meaning. For one thing, the IP 
Clause, as ultimately adopted, is more limited than plenary copyright 
and patent powers would have been.72 Rather than granting a blanket 
power to Congress to enact copyright and patent laws, as Madison 
and Pinckney had each originally proposed, the Framers prefaced the 
Clause’s operative provision with “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by.” The inclusion of such prefatory 
language indicates that the Framers meant for the Clause to achieve 
something other than merely granting to Congress power to enact 
copyright and patent laws. As Section A’s textual and structural 
reading of the text argues, the IP Clause’s preface seems to be a 
limitation.73 Similarly, had the Clause simply given the power “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” Congress 
presumably would have had the power to enact legislation 
encompassing all eight of Madison’s and Pinckney’s proposals and 
then some.74 The actual text and structure emphasize that the IP 
 
 66. Id. at 505. 
 67. Id. at 616. 
 68. Id. 
 69. BUGBEE, supra note 56, at 129. 
 70. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271–72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(addressing the common-law status of works of authorship and inventions and the utility of 
granting the federal government—rather than the states—the power to enact copyright and 
patent laws). 
 71. See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2375–76 (“The most relevant historical 
evidence directly bearing on the original understanding of the Copyright Clause can be 
summarized rapidly. There is little evidence from the Constitutional Convention.”). 
 72. Walterscheid, To Promote, supra note 12, at 80.  
 73. See Oliar, supra note 1, at 1776–77 (providing “three indications that the Framers 
intended the Progress Clause as a limitation on Congress’s intellectual property power”). 
 74. See id. at 1777 (“The Framers . . . . took the limiting language from the rejected 
proposals and tacked it onto Madison and Pinckney’s plenary intellectual property proposals 
before allowing them into the Constitution.”). 
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Clause is more limited than it would have been if it had consisted of 
either the prefatory language or the operative language by itself. 
Congress is granted authority to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, but only in a limited sense: by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors exclusive rights in their writings and 
discoveries.75 
Moreover, the first part of the IP Clause, which concerns 
promoting progress, is derived from Madison’s and Pinckney’s other 
proposals related to intellectual property—namely, those to allow 
Congress to establish universities and to provide grants or prizes for 
innovation.76 The Constitution’s final version did not expressly adopt 
these proposals.77 Professor Oliar primarily uses this observation to 
conclude that the IP Clause ought to be understood as granting 
Congress power to enact copyright and patent laws only if those laws 
promote the progress of science and useful arts.78 But the more 
straightforward understanding strongly suggests the converse, a 
possibility that Oliar secondarily recognizes:79 if Congress wants to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, it can do so only by 
securing to authors and inventors exclusive rights in their writings and 
discoveries for limited times. The Framers rejected multiple other 
ways to promote the progress of science and useful arts—via 
universities or governmental grants and prizes, for example—yet kept 
the language about promoting progress that had originally been 
associated with those proposals. The Framers therefore appear to 
have sought to limit the ways in which Congress can promote the 
progress of science and useful arts—and in particular, to limit 
Congress to the means specified in the IP Clause itself.80 
Exactly why the rejected proposals were cast aside was the 
subject of only minimal discussion. Roger Sherman of Connecticut 
explained that there was no need to give the university power to the 
federal government, as the states could sufficiently establish 
universities instead.81 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania observed 
that despite the elimination of this university power, the federal 
 
 75. See supra Part I.A. 
 76. Oliar, supra note 1, at 1777.  
 77. Id. at 1776–77. 
 78. Id. at 1777, 1811. 
 79. Id. at 1817. 
 80. Id. at 1791–92. 
 81. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 65, at 362. 
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government would nonetheless have a limited ability to create a 
university at the federal seat of government, an area over which the 
government would have exclusive control.82 As for the rejected power 
to award grants and prizes, some contemporaneous evidence suggests 
that the Constitution did not include this power because it would 
have been more expensive for a cash-poor federal government to 
implement than a system of awarding copyrights and patents would 
have been.83 This reason appears to have been grounded in a rejection 
on the merits rather than a judgment that the federal government 
would otherwise fully possess this power under alternative 
provisions.84 
Scholars offer conflicting accounts of the Framers’ views on 
monopolies and of how those views ought to shade a modern 
audience’s understanding of the IP Clause. To the extent that the 
Framers were concerned about monopolies, one might see even more 
reason to conclude that the IP Clause’s carefully calibrated means of 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts ought to be the only 
means of doing so, for fear that pursuing alternative legislative 
strategies might lead too far toward monopolization. Some 
commentators emphasize that the Framers—prominently George 
Mason—and Thomas Jefferson feared monopolies and sought to 
approve of monopolies only narrowly by granting limited rights in 
 
 82. 2 id. at 616. 
 83. Walterscheid, To Promote, supra note 12, at 6 n.21. Scholars offer other theories for 
this decision, such as a desire to limit monopolistic tendencies, a fear of Congress’s favoritism 
toward particular individuals or states, and a desire to minimize the government’s role in the 
marketplace. E.g., Oliar, supra note 1, at 1800–02. 
 84. The means authorized by the IP Clause indicate how Article I, Section 8 more broadly 
focuses on solving problems of collective action among the states by placing power in those 
areas in the hands of Congress. See generally Balkin, supra note 46 (discussing this theory with 
regard to Article I, Section 8 generally); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action 
Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010) (same). Many 
collective-action problems were associated with the preconstitutional implementation of 
copyright and patent laws by states. See supra text accompanying notes 56–60. By giving 
Congress power to enact copyright and patent laws, the Constitution mitigated these problems. 
Relatedly, this theory of collective action explains the intellectual-property powers that the 
Framers rejected: education and grants and prizes. Neither of these powers would have 
implicated any significant collective-action concerns, as the states could have implemented both 
of the contemplated schemes without encountering any unusually worrisome negative 
externalities. This insight does not mean that Congress’s powers extend only to problems of 
collective action or to every problem of collective action, but rather that the Framers were 
convinced that some such problems had to be fixed by Congress. 
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intellectual property.85 In support of their views, these scholars point 
to earlier English copyright and patent laws enacted to curb 
monopolies.86 
Others suggest that the Framers had inconsistent and complex 
views on monopolies.87 For one thing, the Framers did not include a 
constitutional provision that would have forbidden monopolies 
altogether.88 For another, George Mason and others with asserted 
antimonopoly views were, according to Professors Paul Schwartz and 
Dean William Treanor, “concerned with what they feared would be a 
broad implied congressional power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, rather than the express power to authorize patents and 
copyrights.”89 Some Framers may have even thought monopolies were 
good in various circumstances.90 This group of scholars thus suggests 
that antimonopolistic concerns ought not to be relied upon in 
construing the IP Clause.91 They deemphasize the importance of 
Thomas Jefferson’s views in this context, not least because he did not 
participate in the Constitutional Convention.92 
As Professor Nachbar points out, even the antimonopolistic 
views of some of the Framers would not, on their own, establish that 
the IP Clause was meant to place affirmative limits on other federal 
powers. Nachbar comments that “those who would apply the 
Intellectual Property Clause’s limits to all of Article I must identify a 
 
 85. E.g., BOYLE, supra note 19, at 20–28, 170; Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1143–60; 
Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 
84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 925–28 (2002); Walterscheid, IP Clause, supra note 
12, at 769–70. 
 86. E.g., Ochoa & Rose, supra note 85, at 912–16. 
 87. See, e.g., Nachbar, supra note 12, at 329–45 (arguing that James Madison disfavored 
monopolies but did not consider them to be enough of a problem to justify a restriction on 
representative government); Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2334 (arguing that the 
Founders were not uniformly “deeply fearful of . . . monopolies” and pointing to a “range of 
views among the Founders about monopolies”). 
 88. Nachbar, supra note 12, at 329–45.  
 89. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2378. 
 90. See, e.g., id. at 2383–84 (“The Federalists, in general, believed monopolies could 
advance the commonweal.”).  
 91. See, e.g., Nachbar, supra note 12, at 349 (“[T]he granting of monopolies was not 
deemed to be a power different enough in kind or degree from other powers to be worthy of 
limits beyond those inherent in representative government.”).  
 92. E.g., Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2378. Jefferson did, however, see a draft of 
the Constitution that contained the IP Clause, sent to him by Madison. Walterscheid, IP Clause, 
supra note 12, at 769. Jefferson did not mention the IP Clause when he responded to Madison, 
but he urged the inclusion of a bill of rights, among whose provisions would be certain 
restrictions on monopolies. Id. 
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link between that general distaste and the need to constrain 
government from having the power, a link never made by the 
Framers.”93 At most, then, the existence of antimonopolistic views 
among the Framers provides mere shading to supplement the other 
historical evidence on the IP Clause. 
The Framers’ views on monopolies may have ambiguous 
implications for various federal powers. Nonetheless, James 
Madison’s writing on the topic is useful for shedding light on the 
reach of the IP Clause: 
  Monopolies tho’ in certain cases useful ought to be granted with 
caution, and guarded with strictness ag[ain]st abuse. The 
Constitution of the U.S. has limited them to two cases, the authors 
of Books, and of useful inventions, in both which they are 
considered as a compensation for a benefit actually gained to the 
community as a purchase of property which the owner might 
otherwise with[h]old from public use. There can be no just objection 
to a temporary monopoly in these cases: but it ought to be 
temporary, because under that limitation a sufficient recompence 
and encouragement may be given.94 
Madison’s discussion provides evidence that whatever the Framers’ 
overall views on monopolies, Madison himself thought that Congress 
would be unable to grant monopolistic rights in intellectual property 
other than via the means provided in the IP Clause. Although 
Professor Nachbar agrees that this interpretation is facially plausible, 
he writes that a viable alternative account would be that Madison 
thought that no other enumerated power gave Congress the power to 
grant exclusive rights.95 But as discussed in the next Section, a more 
complete look at Madison’s views demonstrates overwhelmingly that 
Madison thought the only way for Congress to grant exclusive rights 
would be through the means provided in the IP Clause. To cite one 
pertinent example, Madison likely believed that the exclusive rights 
that would be provided by a particular legislative proposal for patents 
of importation were within the reach of the Commerce Clause but 
were otherwise restricted by the IP Clause.96 Therefore, the possibility 
 
 93. Nachbar, supra note 12, at 345 (emphasis omitted). 
 94. James Madison, Monopolies. Perpetuities. Corporations. Ecclesiastical Endowments., 
reprinted in Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 551 (Elizabeth Fleet 
ed., 1946).  
 95. Nachbar, supra note 12, at 346–47, 349. 
 96. See infra text accompanying notes 99–109. 
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that Madison did not see exclusive rights of any kind as falling within 
any of Congress’s other powers is unlikely. 
All in all, the history that culminated in the IP Clause’s adoption 
suggests that the Clause ought to be understood as granting Congress 
power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, but only by 
employing copyright and patent protection as limited by the Clause’s 
specified means. The Framers rejected other possible means of 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts, and their rejection 
seems to have been a judgment on the merits that those means would 
be unwise. Moreover, the Clause ultimately retained purposive, ends-
oriented language similar to that contained in the rejected powers—
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The inclusion 
of such language underscores that the IP Clause’s ends should not be 
effectuated by means other than the adopted ones. 
This discussion would seem strongly to establish the IP Clause’s 
internal limits, but what of the ability of Congress to invoke its other 
powers to use alternative means, including the rejected means? The 
same history seems strongly to support the inference that the Framers 
intended Congress to possess no means to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts other than those adopted in the IP Clause. 
And even stronger evidence, taken from the earliest congressional 
activity, encourages the drawing of this inference. I turn now to that 
evidence. 
2. Early Congressional Activity.  Evidence from the 
Constitutional Convention is not the only history helpful for 
understanding the IP Clause. As the Supreme Court emphasized in 
construing the Clause in a 2003 decision, constitutional construction 
can be aided by looking to “a contemporaneous legislative exposition 
of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and 
framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public 
affairs.”97 Early congressional activity can thus shed light on how the 
Framers understood the IP Clause itself and its connection with the 
other congressional powers.98 This evidence demonstrates that the 
Framers understood the IP Clause to operate externally to forbid 
 
 97. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213 (2003) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 
52, 175 (1926)). 
 98. See Currie, supra note 41, at 777 (noting that “the first Congress was a sort of 
continuing constitutional convention,” in part “because so many of its members . . . had helped 
to compose or to ratify the Constitution itself”). 
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Congress from using its other powers to employ means of promoting 
the progress of science and useful arts not specified in the IP Clause. 
A critical piece of evidence supporting the IP Clause’s external 
limitations concerns patents of importation, exclusive rights for 
limited times to the first person to import foreign technologies not 
previously known or in use in the United States. Although a draft of 
the Patent Act of 1790 provided for patents of importation,99 the final 
version of the law that Congress passed during its first session did not 
authorize them.100 The provision was removed on March 5, 1790, after 
debate in the House of Representatives.101 Representative Thomas 
Fitzsimons explained that it had been removed because of “the 
Constitutional power being Questionable.”102 Correspondence reveals 
that James Madison—and possibly others—doubted the 
constitutionality of patents of importation. Tench Coxe, the assistant 
secretary of the treasury and a strong supporter of patents of 
importation as a means of encouraging American manufactures, 
wrote in a letter a few weeks later to Madison:  
I saw with regret the truth of [Madison’s] apprehension, that the 
benefit of a patent could not be constitutionally extended to 
imported objects—nor indeed, if it were within the verge of the 
powers of Congress, do I think any clause to that effect could be 
safely modified. Private acts would be wise and safe, if they could be 
thought constitutional; but I think they cannot without an 
Amendment, by striking out all of the clause that follows the word 
“by” in the 8th parag. of the 8th Sec. of the first Article—or 
something to that purpose.103 
Coxe’s letter makes evident that Madison did not believe that 
Congress could constitutionally provide for patents of importation 
because these patents seemed to lie outside of the means specified in 
the IP Clause, which allows patent rights to be conferred on 
 
 99. H.R. 41, 1st Cong. § 6 (1790), reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1626, 1631 (Charlene Bangs 
Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).  
 100. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).  
 101. Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 873–74 (1998) (citing Letter from Thomas Fitzsimons to Tench 
Coxe (Mar. 5, 1790)). 
 102. Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Fitzsimons to Tench Coxe, supra note 101). 
 103. Letter from Tench Coxe to James Madison (Mar. 21, 1790), reprinted in 13 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 111, 113 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 
1981) (footnote omitted). 
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inventors, not on importers of already-created inventions. For this 
reason, Coxe specified that the only constitutional way to legislate 
patents of importation would be to remove the means limitation 
specified in the IP Clause, thereby allowing the promotion of the 
progress of science and useful arts by any means, including through 
patents of importation.104 A subsequent draft105 of what became the 
1791 Report on the Subject of Manufactures106 by Alexander Hamilton 
also expressed doubt over the constitutionality of patents of 
importation.107 
This evidence has consequences for both the IP Clause’s scope 
and its relationship to the other enumerated powers. As to the 
former, James Madison and others fairly clearly believed that 
Congress could not rely on the IP Clause to implement any means of 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts beyond the means 
specified in the Clause. Patents of importation represented one 
example of such impermissible means. 
What has gone unobserved, however, is that this evidence also 
shows that Madison—and apparently others in the First Congress—
believed that Congress could not invoke any of its other enumerated 
powers to enact means of promoting the progress of science and 
useful arts. But for the IP Clause, Congress would likely have had the 
authority to provide for patents of importation pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause. Even under the more limited understanding of the 
Commerce Clause at that early juncture in American history,108 the 
foreign-commerce powers would have authorized provisions for 
patents of importation, as those kinds of provisions would have 
regulated items of trade being imported from foreign countries into 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Alexander Hamilton, First Draft of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures (1790), 
reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 23 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1966). 
 106. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures 
(1791), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 230. 
 107. Hamilton, supra note 105, at 37; see also Walterscheid, supra note 101, at 865–66 
(discussing the development of Hamilton’s thoughts regarding patents of importation). 
 108. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15–16 (2005) (“For the first century of our history, 
the primary use of the [Commerce] Clause was to preclude the kind of discriminatory state 
legislation that had once been permissible.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the 
Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1987) (arguing that Alexander Hamilton’s 
understanding of the word “commerce” was “restrictive by modern standards”). But see Balkin, 
supra note 46, at 5 (arguing that the commerce power was understood broadly during the 
eighteenth century).  
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the United States.109 That Madison and likely others thought that 
Congress could not establish patents of importation under the 
Commerce Clause strongly indicates that they thought that the IP 
Clause externally limited Congress’s ability to promote the progress 
of science and useful arts by any means other than those laid out in 
the IP Clause itself. 
The same conclusion can be drawn from Madison’s views on 
granting land to encourage the importation of inventions. In his series 
of letters with Coxe following the excision of the provision concerning 
patents of importation from what became the first federal patent law, 
Coxe advocated that Congress “appropriat[e] a district of territory to 
the encouragement of imported inventions” if patents of importation 
could not directly be allowed.110 Madison replied with skepticism as to 
the constitutionality of such land grants. He stated explicitly that 
Congress’s powers of encouraging invention are limited to the means 
specified in the IP Clause, thus excluding the possibility of land 
grants: 
I can not but apprehend . . . that the clause in the constitution which 
forbids patents for [importation] will lie equally in the way of your 
expedient. Congress seem[s] to be tied down to the single mode of 
encouraging inventions by granting the exclusive benefit of them for 
a limited time, and therefore to have no more power to give a 
further encouragement out of a fund of land than a fund of money. 
This fetter on the National Legislature tho’ an unfortunate one, was 
a deliberate one. The Latitude of authority now wished for was 
strongly urged and expressly rejected.111 
 
 109. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At 
the time the original Constitution was ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and 
bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
189–90, 196–97 (1824) (finding that “commerce” includes “the commercial intercourse between 
nations”); Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 962 (2010) 
(arguing that Congress’s foreign-commerce power is robust because historically there has been 
an “overriding concern that the federal government speak with one voice when regulating 
foreign commerce”); Epstein, supra note 108, at 1394–95 (discussing the importance and 
purpose of the foreign-commerce power). The Supreme Court has noted that “[a]lthough the 
Constitution, [Article I, Section 8, Clause 3], grants Congress power to regulate commerce ‘with 
foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several States’ in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the 
Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.” Japan Line, 
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). 
 110. Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe (Mar. 28, 1790), reprinted in 13 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 103, at 128, 128. 
 111. Id. Madison later stated in his first presidential inaugural address that he would use 
“authorized means” to promote technological progress, implying that some means of promoting 
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As much as this letter emphasizes Madison’s view that the IP Clause 
permits Congress only its specified means to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, it also indicates that Congress cannot use 
means otherwise within its enumerated powers to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts. Madison doubted Congress’s 
power to grant federal land in exchange for importing technologies 
from other countries, despite the existence of the constitutional 
power granted to Congress in Article IV, Section 3 “to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States.”112 
Further evidence buttresses this understanding of the IP Clause’s 
external limitation of Congress’s other powers. In his first annual 
message to Congress in 1790, President Washington invoked the goal 
of “promot[ing] . . . science and literature” and asked the first 
Congress to create a national university.113 Congress subsequently 
debated the issue. Prominent among the arguments made against a 
national university was that Congress had no power to create one. 
Roger Sherman noted that the Constitutional Convention had 
rejected giving Congress the power to create a university, thereby 
leaving this power to the states instead.114 Similarly, Representative 
Michael Stone of Maryland and others stated that the Constitution 
did not authorize Congress to create a university.115 These positions 
 
progress are unavailable to the federal government. James Madison, First Inaugural Address 
(Mar. 4, 1809), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 47, 49 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908). 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Notably, many years later, in 1862, Congress employed 
this power in the Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862), to give states federal land to establish 
colleges and universities, id. Some argued against the law’s passage based on the IP Clause’s 
external limitations. John H. Florer, Major Issues in the Congressional Debate of the Morrill Act 
of 1862, 8 HIST. EDUC. Q. 459, 463–65 (1968). In addition to occurring much later in the nation’s 
history, this action was arguably consistent with Congress’s earlier rejection of the university 
power: it was undertaken to provide states with land so that they might exercise their 
constitutionally acceptable authority to create universities. 
 113. George Washington, First Annual Address (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted in 1 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 30, at 65, 66. 
 114. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1551 (1790). 
 115. Id.; Gazette of the United States (May 5, 1790), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 99, at 1220, 1221. In 1821, Congress 
created the Columbian College in the District of Columbia, The Columbian College: Where It 
All Began, GEO. WASH. UNIV., http://columbian.gwu.edu/aboutus/history (last visited Mar. 19, 
2012), pursuant to its power “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over 
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the 
acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States,” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 17. With regard to Washington, D.C., the seat of the U.S. government, Congress’s 
powers resemble the powers reserved to the states and include those otherwise forbidden to 
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support the premise that the Constitutional Convention’s rejection of 
a university power as a means of promoting the progress of science 
and useful arts precluded Congress from fulfilling President 
Washington’s request. 
Similar is the earliest Congress’s view as to whether the federal 
government could fund artistic, scientific, and technological work, a 
means not specified in the IP Clause. In 1789, a man named John 
Churchman asked the House of Representatives to support his 
invention for determining longitude based on the magnetic variation 
at places of known latitude. Churchman asked Congress to help him 
in two ways: first, by awarding him exclusive rights in the invention; 
and second, by funding a voyage to Baffin Bay to help him further 
develop the invention.116 A congressional committee debated this 
request, readily concluding that Churchman ought to receive an 
exclusive right for a limited term in exchange for publishing his 
invention.117 Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina, 
however, questioned whether the IP Clause would allow the 
legislature “to go further in rewarding the inventors of useful 
machines, or discoveries in sciences, than merely to secure to them 
for a time the right of making, publishing and vending them.”118 
Similarly, Roger Sherman expressed doubt that Congress could 
comply with Churchman’s request for funding: 
[Our grant of an exclusive right to him] appears gone as far as 
proper to go at this time, as far as warranted by the 
Constitution. . . . If have a right to go further and lay out money it 
must be upon—Gentleman has fruitful invention. Large sums might 
be expended which finally might be to no advantage. The committee 
thought fit to go as far as this to promote the progress; they did not 
think proper to give any further power to encourage this useful 
discovery.119 
 
Congress. Therefore, even if Congress is forbidden via the IP Clause from creating universities 
pursuant to its other enumerated powers, its power to do so pursuant to its plenary power over 
the District of Columbia seems to trump the IP Clause’s external limitations. Cf. Eugene 
Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts: The Forgotten Precedent of Slave-
Trade Tribunals, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 51 (2009) (observing that “[t]he absolute nature of 
congressional control [over the District of Columbia] has suggested . . . that some other 
constitutional constraints do not apply”).  
 116. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 143 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 117. Id. at 170–71. 
 118. Id. at 173. 
 119. Lloyd’s Notes (Apr. 20, 1789), reprinted in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 99, at 206, 213.  
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Other representatives questioned the power to fund as well.120 The 
committee tabled the funding request given “the present deranged 
state of [the federal government’s] finances.”121 No resolution in hand, 
Churchman renewed his request for funding, and a congressional 
committee ultimately rejected it in 1791 because of the constitutional 
questions it raised, questions the committee did not want to explore.122 
In 1796, a congressional committee stated this concern more 
pointedly: “[A]pplication to Congress for pecuniary encouragement 
of important discoveries, or of useful arts, cannot be complied with, as 
the Constitution of the United States appears to have limited the 
powers of Congress to granting patents only.”123 Of all those who 
voiced an opinion on the matter, none appears to have thought that 
the means specified in the IP Clause might encompass the funding of 
artistic, scientific, and technological works. 
This discussion is instructive when placed alongside another 
broader contemporaneous constitutional debate. At issue in that 
debate was whether the Spending Clause—authorizing Congress to 
“provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States”124—enables Congress to spend on things beyond what the 
enumerated powers otherwise permit. James Madison argued that 
because “the United States is a government of limited and 
enumerated powers, the grant of power to tax and spend for the 
general national welfare must be confined to the enumerated 
legislative fields committed to the Congress.”125 Taking the opposite 
position, Alexander Hamilton contended that “the clause confers a 
power separate and distinct from [other enumerated powers] . . . [and 
is] limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to 
 
 120. For example, Representatives Joshua Seney, John Page, and Alexander White all 
questioned the government’s authority to fund the invention’s further development. Id. at 214–
15.  
 121. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1789). Madison later vaguely spoke in favor of 
Churchman’s research efforts without discussing the funding request specifically. Lloyd’s Notes, 
supra note 119, at 211–12, 217–18. 
 122. H. COMM., 1ST CONG., REP. (1791), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 99, at 530, 530–31.  
 123. H.R. DOC. NO. 4-74 (1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MISCELLANEOUS 140, 140 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Wash, D.C., Gales & 
Seaton 1832); cf. Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the 
Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 99–100 (1999) (discussing similar early 
congressional doubts about the constitutionality of federal educational funding). 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 125. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). 
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provide for the general welfare of the United States.”126 Whether the 
Spending Clause allowed spending on items not included in the 
enumerated powers—or in the specific context here, on items not 
permitted by the IP Clause’s means—was very much a live issue at 
the time.127 In the context of Churchman’s funding request, however, 
the committee members thought that Congress likely lacked the 
authority to fund Churchman’s scientific research despite the 
Spending Clause. 
In sum, the evidence from early congressional activity 
overwhelmingly suggests that the Framers believed that the IP Clause 
could be employed to promote the progress of science and useful arts 
only by using the means specified in that Clause and that Congress 
could not use its other enumerated powers to employ any other 
means. 
C. Judicial Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the IP Clause’s 
external limitations directly. Nonetheless, its cases construing the IP 
Clause and constitutional structure generally are consistent with—
and oftentimes are supportive of—an IP Clause that externally limits 
Congress’s other powers. 
The Supreme Court has stated numerous times that the power 
conferred on Congress by the IP Clause is specifically a power “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” and that the means 
to achieve that goal are specified in the latter part of the Clause.128 
The Supreme Court has also examined the reach of the IP Clause. 
But the Court’s discussions—frequently in dicta—have usually 
occurred in the context of determining the internal constraints of the 
IP Clause itself, not in the context of determining whether the IP 
Clause might impose affirmative limits on Congress’s other 
enumerated powers. For example, in a 1989 preemption case, the 
Supreme Court noted,  
[T]he Clause contains both a grant of power and certain limitations 
upon the exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent 
 
 126. Id. at 65–66. 
 127. Not until 1936 did the Supreme Court definitively side with Hamilton on this issue, 
albeit not in the context of intellectual property. See infra Part II.B.2 
 128. E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346, 349 (1991); Goldstein 
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermkt. Equip. Corp., 
340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879).  
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monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it “authorize the 
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge 
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials 
already available.”129 
Similarly, the Court stated in an earlier case interpreting patent law’s 
nonobviousness requirement that “[t]he [IP] clause is both a grant of 
power and a limitation” and that “Congress in the exercise of the 
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purpose.”130 Whether one ought to infer from these 
statements that the IP Clause limits Congress’s overall ability to 
regulate intellectual property outside of the means provided in the 
Clause is not entirely clear. 
The IP Clause’s external limitations can be more readily inferred 
from the Supreme Court’s 1879 decision in the Trade-Mark Cases.131 
In that case, the Court struck down as unconstitutional the first 
federal trademark law, which Congress had enacted pursuant to the 
IP Clause.132 The Court’s reasoning was muddled, but it suggested that 
the decision was resolved this way because trademark protection has 
nothing—at least proximately—to do with promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts. The Court indicated that the IP Clause 
designates the means that Congress may use—“by securing for 
limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries”—to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts.133 The Court observed that “[t]he ordinary 
trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery” and 
that a trademark should not be understood as a “writing[]” within the 
bounds of the IP Clause.134 Because trademark law’s purpose is not to 
 
 129. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (quoting 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). 
 130. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6; see also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 154 (Douglas, 
J., concurring) (finding that the IP Clause, “unlike most of the specific powers which Congress is 
given, . . . is qualified”). 
 131. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
 132. Id. at 93–94. 
 133. Id. at 93. 
 134. Id. The Supreme Court subsequently made a similar point in interpreting the phrase 
“origin of goods” in the Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2006)), the federal implementation of the trademark laws. The Court 
concluded in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), that the 
rights conferred by the Lanham Act belong to “the producer of the tangible goods that are 
offered for sale” rather than “the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in 
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promote the progress of science and useful arts but rather to support 
fair competition and consumer protection,135 trademark laws are not 
plausibly within the reach of the IP Clause. The Court, however, left 
open the possibility that Congress might permissibly enact a 
trademark law under the Commerce Clause instead.136 
This construction is consistent with—and supportive of—the 
notion of an IP Clause that externally limits Congress’s other powers. 
It suggests that if a law is not aimed at promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts, then Congress may not enact the law pursuant 
to the IP Clause and may enact the law only if it finds another 
enumerated power as a hook.137 This reasoning constructs a 
channeling mechanism of sorts: laws concerned with the promotion of 
the progress of science and useful arts ought to be channeled into the 
purview of the IP Clause and must comply with its limiting means, 
and those that are not must be channeled elsewhere, into the purview 
of another enumerated power.138 In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Court 
was called upon to deal with the latter situation. It has not, however, 
been called upon to address directly the former situation. 
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the IP Clause in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft139 in 2003 is also consistent with my understanding. In that 
case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Congress’s 1998 
copyright-term extension for existing works protected by copyright, a 
move that had the effect of placing those existing works on equal 
durational footing with new works that were also covered by the term 
 
those goods.” Id. at 37. The Court rejected the latter, broader possible interpretation because it 
would “creat[e] a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.” Id. 
 135. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Role of Creativity in Trademark Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1885, 1891 (2011) (“Trademark law came to emphasize protecting consumers from confusion to 
foster fair competition and to justify a more extensive right.”). 
 136. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94–98 (questioning “whether trade-mark bears such a 
relation to commerce in general terms as to bring it within congressional control,” yet proposing 
that the Court leave the issue undecided in light of “the dictate of wisdom and judicial 
propriety”).  
 137. Other courts construing the Trade-Mark Cases have focused on the latter part of the IP 
Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Court [in 
the Trademark Cases] held that a criminal trademark statute was not authorized by the 
Copyright Clause because trademarks do not require originality.”).  
 138. That said, the Supreme Court has implied in an offhand dictum that the Commerce 
Clause might be invoked, in addition to the IP Clause, to regulate intellectual property. See 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973) (“Where the need for free and unrestricted 
distribution of a writing is thought to be required by the national interest, the Copyright Clause 
and the Commerce Clause would allow Congress to eschew all protection.”). 
 139. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
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extension.140 Relying on text, history, and precedent, the Court held 
that the “limited Times” for which Congress may grant copyright 
protection includes the practice of extending copyright protection for 
already-protected works from one limited time to another.141 
More relevant for the purposes of this Article, however, is the 
tripartite framework the Supreme Court applied to evaluate the law’s 
constitutionality. First, the Court looked to the structure of the term-
extension law to see if there was any “cause to suspect that a purpose 
to evade the ‘limited Times’ prescription [had] prompted Congress” 
to enact it.142 This analytical move suggests that future analysis might 
do well to look to an intellectual-property law’s structure and 
motivation to evince the law’s purpose. Second, although the 
Supreme Court accorded no deference to Congress in analyzing what 
“limited Times” means and whether the copyright law at issue truly 
did provide protection for only “limited Times,” the question of 
whether the law was a proper exercise of Congress’s power under the 
IP Clause was one the Supreme Court evaluated by measuring—with 
substantial deference to the legislature—whether the law was “a 
rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the [IP 
Clause].”143 Third, the Court recognized, as it had in previous 
decisions,144 that promotion of the progress of science and useful arts 
is the purpose for which Congress may enact intellectual-property 
legislation and that Congress may do so by using any of the means 
outlined in the Clause.145 
The combination of these three analytical components supports 
my understanding of the IP Clause. By invoking these components, 
the Court suggested that when Congress acts via legislation to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, it must choose to do 
so by the means specified in the IP Clause. The Court will uphold any 
legislation that has the end of promoting the progress of science and 
useful arts as long as it secures exclusive rights to authors and 
inventors in their writings and discoveries for limited times. If 
legislation with this purpose lacks any of these qualities—(1) securing 
exclusive rights (2) to authors and inventors (3) for their writings and 
 
 140. Id. at 193–94. 
 141. Id. at 199–203. 
 142. Id. at 199–200. 
 143. Id. at 204–05. 
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 128–30. 
 145. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211–12.  
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discoveries (4) for limited times—as these qualities have been defined 
by the courts, then the Court will strike down the law as 
unconstitutional. 
This understanding refutes Justice Stevens’s claim in his Eldred 
dissent that the majority was reading the IP Clause “to provide 
essentially no limit on congressional action under the Clause.”146 To 
the contrary, the majority indicated that when Congress seeks to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, it must act within the 
Clause’s means—by providing rights only for “limited Times,” as 
construed by the Court, for example. The Court’s opinion suggests a 
substantial limit on congressional action, one the First Congress 
willingly imposed on itself with regard to patents of importation, land 
grants, research funding, and establishment of a national university.147 
It also suggests a significant restraint for modern times, one that I 
explore in questioning the constitutionality of multiple federal laws. 
The Supreme Court has not said much more on limitations that 
the IP Clause imposes on other enumerated powers. Yet Court 
opinions in other constitutional areas shed light on the structural 
relationship between the IP Clause and other congressional powers, a 
relationship that supports the notion of an IP Clause that imposes 
external limitations on those powers. 
In the landmark civil-rights case of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States,148 the Supreme Court upheld federal legislation banning 
racial discrimination in public accommodations.149 The Court 
reasoned that the ban was a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce 
power, as it was “carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and 
substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people.”150 The 
Court refused to accept the argument that the law should be struck 
down as outside the scope of Congress’s powers merely because the 
Civil War amendments had not expressly granted the power to enact 
the law.151 The Court reasoned that as long as the Commerce Clause 
 
 146. Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The 
majority believes these conclusions rest upon practical judgments that at most suggest the 
statute is unwise, not that it is unconstitutional.”). 
 147. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 148. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 149. Id. at 261–62. 
 150. Id. at 250–51. 
 151. See id. at 261–62 (upholding the ban as a valid exercise of congressional power under 
the Commerce Clause). 
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could be held to grant the power, the specific authority conferred by 
the amendments was irrelevant.152 
Some scholars read the Trade-Mark Cases and Heart of Atlanta 
Motel as permitting Congress to legislate under one power when 
another power is closed off. For example, Professor Nachbar states 
that these cases suggest that Congress can use its other Article I, 
Section 8 powers to legislate when the IP Clause’s limitations bar it 
from acting under that power.153 
Professor Nachbar’s reading, however, is unwarranted. In Heart 
of Atlanta Motel, no reason existed to support the implication that the 
Civil War amendments’ failure to ban racial discrimination in public 
accommodations prevented Congress from using one of its 
enumerated powers to accomplish that goal. The Court perceived no 
basis to infer a conflict between those amendments and Congress’s 
other powers. The situation is different in the context of the IP 
Clause. The history, text, and structure discussed in Sections A and B 
provide strong reasons to see just such a conflict between the IP 
Clause and Congress’s other enumerated powers. The analogy to 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, therefore, is inapposite. 
More on point is the Supreme Court’s decision about the 
relationship between the Bankruptcy154 and Commerce155 Clauses in 
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons.156 In that case, Congress 
had provided economic benefits for the employees of a railroad 
company that had declared bankruptcy.157 The Court rejected the 
argument that the action had been an exercise of Congress’s 
commerce power on the basis that the clause’s structural purpose is to 
allocate resources in a bankruptcy situation.158 Next, the Court 
examined whether the law was a valid exercise of Congress’s 
bankruptcy power. The Court ruled that it was not because the law 
had made bankruptcy laws nonuniform by causing the particular 
 
 152. Id. at 250–51. 
 153. See Nachbar, supra note 12, at 293–94 (“The Trade-Mark Cases and Heart of Atlanta at 
the very least mean that when one power does not support legislation, Congress can look to 
another . . . .”); id. at 296 (”[T]he operating principle[] most clearly at work in Heart of Atlanta 
and the Trade-Mark Cases . . . [is] that the absence of a grant in one power-conferring provision 
is not indicative of the denial of that grant under another provision.”). 
 154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 155. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 156. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 157. Id. at 461–63. 
 158. Id. at 465–67. 
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provisions at issue to conflict with the general bankruptcy provisions’ 
priorities.159 The Court reasoned that Congress could not invoke the 
Commerce Clause to enact nonuniform bankruptcy provisions 
because “the Bankruptcy Clause itself contains an affirmative 
limitation or restriction upon Congress’ power: bankruptcy laws must 
be uniform throughout the United States.”160 
Although Professor Nachbar suggests that Gibbons was 
incorrectly decided or should not be broadly applied to other Article 
I, Section 8 powers,161 the Court’s reasoning applies even more 
strongly to the IP Clause. The historical and other evidence that the 
IP Clause should limit Congress’s other enumerated powers is more 
robust than any evidence of the negative implications one might draw 
from the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.162 As 
such, the structural reasoning that the Court employed in the 
bankruptcy context ought to apply even more readily to the IP Clause 
to forbid Congress from evading the limited means allowed for 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts by invoking another 
enumerated power. 
Having discussed the relevant judicial doctrine, I now turn to an 
analysis of policy considerations informing the IP Clause to provide 
another window into understanding the Clause’s external limitations. 
 
 159. Id. at 468–71. 
 160. Id. at 468. Similar is Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), which involved an 
alleged clash between Congress’s power to establish a monetary system, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 5, and its power “To borrow Money on the credit of the United States,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
The Court in Perry held that “Congress can[not] use th[e first] power so as to invalidate the 
terms of the obligations which the government has theretofore issued in the exercise of the 
power to borrow money on the credit of the United States.” Perry, 294 U.S. at 350. It reasoned 
that doing so would negate the promise inherent in the federal government’s power to borrow 
money on U.S. credit. Id. at 353. 
 161. See Nachbar, supra note 12, at 308, 313 (reasoning that Gibbons would be “subject to 
failure if broadly applied” and finding that “blindly applying Gibbons would prevent federal 
regulation of purely intrastate commercial conduct . . . involving intellectual property”). 
 162. Cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”?: Copyright and Other Protection of Works of 
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 370 (1992) (“Justice 
Rehnquist declared: ‘If we were to hold that Congress had power to enact nonuniform 
bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a 
limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.’ Under this approach, one could 
contend that a law protecting compiled information under the Commerce Clause would 
similarly be invalidated as an attempt to elude a substantive limitation on Congress’ power to 
grant copyrights.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468–69)). 
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D. Policy 
The dominant policy underlying the protection of intellectual 
property in the United States is utilitarian and is grounded in the IP 
Clause. This utilitarian policy supplements the evidence discussed in 
the previous Sections to support the idea that the IP Clause externally 
limits Congress’s ability to use means other than those specified in the 
IP Clause to promote the progress of science and useful arts. 
Utilitarianism is the dominant purpose of American copyright163 
and patent law.164 According to utilitarian theory, copyright law 
provides the incentive of exclusive rights for a limited duration to 
authors to motivate them to create culturally valuable works.165 
Without this incentive, the theory goes, authors might not invest the 
time, energy, or money necessary to create the works because such 
works might be copied cheaply and easily by free riders, thereby 
eliminating authors’ ability to profit from their labors.166 Parallel 
reasoning supports patent law’s protection of inventors’ exclusive 
rights in their technologically or scientifically valuable inventions for 
limited periods of time. The theory is that public benefits accrue by 
rewarding inventors for taking two steps they likely would not 
otherwise have taken: first, to invent, and possibly commercialize; and 
second, to reveal information to the public about their inventions that 
serves to stimulate further innovation.167 
Utilitarianism aligns with the IP Clause. Consistent with 
utilitarianism, the rights conferred by copyright and patent laws are 
designed to be limited in time and scope.168 The reason for providing 
copyright and patent protection to creators is to encourage them to 
produce socially valuable works, thereby maximizing social welfare.169 
 
 163. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); 122 
CONG. REC. 2834 (1976) (statement of Sen. John Little McClellan); William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 
(1989). 
 164. E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597–99 (2003). 
 165. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197 
(1996). 
 166. Alina Ng, The Author’s Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 453–54 (2009). 
 167. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 547–54 (2009). 
 168. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 989, 997 (1997). 
 169. Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 
70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 592–96 (1985). 
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If the provided rights were exceedingly extensive, society would be 
hurt and social welfare diminished.170 Exclusive rights in intellectual 
property prevent competition in protected works, often allowing the 
rights holder to charge a premium for access and ultimately limiting 
these valuable works’ diffusion into society.171 Moreover, given that 
knowledge is frequently cumulative, society benefits when subsequent 
creators are not prevented from building on previous artistic, 
scientific, and technological creations to generate new works.172 
Therefore, copyright and patent laws ensure both that the works that 
they protect will fall into the public domain in due course and that 
third parties will be free to use the protected works for certain 
socially valuable purposes.173 
At bottom, utilitarian theories of intellectual property rest on the 
premise that the benefit to society of creators’ crafting valuable works 
offsets the costs to society of the incentives the law offers to those 
creators.174 The power conferred on Congress by the IP Clause reflects 
a desire to reach a balance between granting creators the exclusive 
rights to create and disseminate publicly valuable works and 
restricting those rights so that the public is not hurt.175 The Supreme 
Court has stated as much in numerous decisions.176 This principle is 
longstanding.177 Congress may thus act to secure intellectual-property 
protection as long as it does not upset the carefully calibrated balance 
established by the IP Clause.178 
 
 170. Lemley, supra note 168, at 996–97. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 997–98. 
 173. Id. at 999. 
 174. Id. at 996–97; see also PATRY, supra note 19, at 123 (“The Constitution is quite clear 
that Congress can only grant copyright to promote the progress of science, and thus this 
‘burden’ exists from the inception of the rights, and follows those rights for the duration of the 
copyright.”). 
 175. Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and 
Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509, 527–28. 
 176. E.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1994); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974) (“[A]dditions to the general store of knowledge are of such 
importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 
years of exclusive use . . . .”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229–31 (1964) 
(“Patents are not given as favors . . . but are meant to encourage invention . . . .”). 
 177. E.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185–86 (1896). 
 178. See id. (“It is self evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it 
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public 
property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.”). 
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In this vein, the Supreme Court has strongly indicated that the IP 
Clause contemplates the existence of a public domain that cannot be 
undone. For example, in the context of discussing the relationship 
between federal powers under the IP Clause and state authority, the 
Court has noted that 
the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and 
technologies into the public domain through disclosure. State law 
protection for techniques and designs whose disclosure has already 
been induced by market rewards may conflict with the very purpose 
of the patent laws by decreasing the range of ideas available as the 
building blocks of further innovation. . . . To a limited extent, the 
federal patent laws must determine not only what is protected, but 
also what is free for all to use.179 
The policy of maintaining a balance between public benefit and 
intellectual-property rights for creators is deeply utilitarian in 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts. Laws that upset this 
calibrated balance by transgressing the limits set by the IP Clause—
say, by offering rights of unlimited duration or by offering rights to 
someone other than the creator—are therefore particularly 
troublesome. In this sense, policy interests support the idea that 
Congress is disallowed from using any of its powers to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts other than the power conferred by 
the IP Clause itself. 
That said, one might readily imagine Congress’s using means 
other than those specified in the IP Clause that, as a policy matter, do 
not upset the balance envisioned by the IP Clause. For example, 
federal funding of scientific research or cultural works would seem, as 
a policy matter, to promote the progress of science and useful arts 
without undermining public utility. At the right price, the cost of such 
funding would be exceeded by the public benefit, all without the 
monopoly-like effects that can result from patent and copyright laws. 
On the whole, then, intellectual property’s utilitarian basis—
reflected in the IP Clause—supports the Clause’s external limitations, 
at least as far as Congress might use its other powers to subvert the 
means set out in the IP Clause. To the extent that Congress would use 
its other powers to employ means that do not affect the calibrated 
 
 179. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) 
(“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”). 
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balance set out in the IP Clause’s text, these same policy concerns are 
not necessarily implicated. 
*          *          * 
This Part demonstrates that the combination of textual and 
structural analysis, historical evidence, judicial doctrine, and policy 
favors the existence of external limitations in the IP Clause that 
operate to ban Congress from using its other enumerated powers to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts via means not 
authorized by the IP Clause. 
Some other scholars working on this topic conclude that the IP 
Clause limits Congress’s other powers, but they take different 
approaches from the one advanced in this Article—approaches that 
either require more complex analytical frameworks or are less 
grounded in the foregoing evidence. For one, former Professor Patry 
does think that the IP Clause restricts Congress’s other powers. He 
reads the Supreme Court’s doctrine as holding that the IP Clause 
“contains both positive and negative rights: a positive right to grant 
authors a limited monopoly in their original material, and a negative 
right in the public to copy unoriginal material.”180 Patry elaborates 
that “these two rights are mutually exclusive: either an author has an 
exclusive right over given material, or the public has a right to copy 
that material. Both rights cannot be exercised at the same time with 
respect to the same material.”181 As such, Patry claims that Congress 
may not provide for perpetual intellectual-property protection, as 
doing so would contravene the “limited Times” restriction of the IP 
Clause.182 Similarly, according to Patry, databases lacking sufficient 
constitutional originality to qualify for copyright protection should 
not be protectable under legislation enacted pursuant to one of 
Congress’s other powers.183 
Former Professor Patry’s analysis does not go far enough in light 
of the evidence presented in this Part. By insisting that Congress’s 
powers are restricted only with regard to unoriginal material, Patry 
does not address the evidence supporting an understanding that all 
means that are not specified in the IP Clause are off-limits. 
 
 180. Patry, supra note 17, at 362. 
 181. Id. at 364. 
 182. Id. at 376 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8). 
 183. Id. at 384–86. 
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Like former Professor Patry, Professor Yochai Benkler proposes 
that the IP Clause is “a specifically limited grant available only to 
protect original contributions to the wealth of human knowledge”184 
and that Congress cannot legislate beyond those bounds, even using 
its other powers.185 More specifically, Benkler suggests that 
Congress may create [IP] rights if and when they are likely to 
encourage information production more than they inhibit it, if it 
makes them available only to those who make original contributions 
to the wealth of our collective knowledge, and if the exclusive right 
enacted does not remove, or burden free access to, information 
already in the public domain.186  
Benkler suggests that Congress can use its other powers to “regulate 
information markets” only if the laws that it creates are different in 
kind from those authorized under the IP Clause.187 To derive these 
limitations, Benkler relies on doctrinal and policy analysis,188 along 
with what seems to be an implicit argument that the IP Clause’s 
restrictions would be too easy to evade if they did not limit Congress’s 
other powers. Under his framework, Benkler concludes that some 
possible legislation protecting databases is unconstitutional.189 
Professors Paul Schwartz and William Treanor call Professor 
Benkler’s analysis “a highly unconventional originalist linguistic 
argument, which turns on the Framers’ alleged understanding of a 
single word: ‘Progress.’”190 In any event, like former Professor Patry’s 
position, Benkler’s analysis does not go as far as it might in light of 
the myriad pieces of evidence suggesting that all means not specified 
in the IP Clause are off-limits to Congress. 
Professors Paul Heald and Suzanna Sherry also think that the IP 
Clause limits Congress’s other powers. They rely on early American 
history, which they read as reflecting a widespread suspicion toward 
governmental grants of exclusive rights, to suggest that “the 
Intellectual Property Clause was included as both a grant of power to 
 
 184. Benkler, supra note 16, at 540. 
 185. Id. at 536–40. 
 186. Id. at 551. 
 187. Id. at 551–52. 
 188. Id. at 558–74. 
 189. Id. at 575–87. 
 190. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2340–41. 
FROMER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2012  8:25 PM 
2012] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 1371 
Congress and also an absolute limitation of its power.”191 Based on 
this reading, they identify five principles that delineate the reach of 
Congress’s IP powers: the “Suspect Grant Principle,” which provides 
that “the limiting language of the Clause . . . [applies] only to 
legislation that imposes monopoly-like costs on the public through 
the granting of exclusive rights”;192 the “Quid Pro Principle,” under 
which laws enacted pursuant to the Clause must be premised on “the 
author or the inventor . . . giv[ing] the public something it did not 
have before to earn a grant of exclusive rights from Congress”;193 the 
“Authorship Principle,” which dictates that the creator must receive 
the grant of exclusive rights;194 the “Public Domain Principle,” which 
specifies that the rights should last for a limited time, after which 
point the protected work must fall into the public domain;195 and the 
“Flexibility Principle,” which provides Congress with broad discretion 
to decide how to wield its powers under the IP Clause.196 Heald and 
Sherry conclude that Congress may not use its other powers, such as 
the commerce or treaty powers, to enact laws that flout these 
principles.197 They suggest that these principles can holistically guide 
decisions on various laws’ constitutionality.198 For example, they use 
their framework to suggest that the copyright-term extension that the 
Supreme Court upheld in Eldred199 is unconstitutional because it 
violates the Quid Pro Principle and the Public Domain Principle.200 
Although the holistic framework of Professors Heald and Sherry 
shares points of commonality with the more streamlined approach I 
take, it is too complex both to conceptualize and to apply.201 
 
 191. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1160. Professor Pollack similarly reads various 
limitations into the IP Clause, including that the Clause “prevents Congress from giving authors 
or inventors exclusive rights unbounded by premeasured time limitations.” Malla Pollack, 
Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce 
Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 259, 260 (1995). 
 192. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1160 (emphasis omitted). 
 193. Id. at 1162. 
 194. Id. at 1164. 
 195. Id. at 1165.  
 196. Id. at 1166–67. 
 197. Id. at 1167. 
 198. Id. at 1167, 1197. 
 199. See supra text accompanying notes 139–47. 
 200. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1168–74. 
 201. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2341–42. 
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To sum up, this Part surveys considerable evidence from multiple 
vantage points—text, structure, history, judicial doctrine, and 
policy—that supports the IP Clause’s external limitations. This Part 
thus refutes the claims of Professor Thomas Nachbar that the IP 
Clause does not reach out to limit Congress’s other powers. 
Moreover, it yields a framework for evaluating laws’ constitutionality, 
a subject to which I now turn. 
II.  FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING CONSTITUTIONALITY 
This Part builds on Part I’s evidence of the IP Clause’s external 
limitations to suggest a framework for evaluating a law’s 
constitutionality. Generally, if a law has only the structural purpose of 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts, it must comply with 
the means described in the IP Clause. If it does not comply with those 
means, it is unconstitutional. If the law lacks the structural purpose of 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts, it is outside the IP 
Clause’s purview and must be enacted pursuant to another of 
Congress’s powers, as is the case with trademark law. If, in addition to 
the structural purpose of promoting the progress of science and useful 
arts, the law has another legitimate purpose pursuant to Congress’s 
other powers, such as promoting trade or foreign relations, Congress 
may act beyond the IP Clause’s means only if it overcomes a 
presumption against the law’s constitutionality. That is, the law ought 
to be deemed constitutional only if clear and convincing evidence 
demonstrates that Congress intentionally chose to supersede the IP 
Clause’s means because of paramount interests pursuant to its other 
more permissive powers. This presumption ought to be extremely 
hard to overcome when a law’s means subvert those in the IP 
Clause—such as by granting perpetual copyright protection—as 
compared to a law whose means merely are not contained in the IP 
Clause—such as funding for scientific research. 
Section A of this Part discusses how to assess whether a law’s 
function is to promote the progress of science and useful arts through 
the lens of structural purpose. It also addresses how to analyze laws 
with multiple legitimate constitutional purposes, creating a 
presumption framework for assessing constitutionality in those cases. 
Section B then turns to some of the most likely sources of conflict 
with the IP Clause: the commerce, spending, necessary-and-proper, 
and treaty powers. 
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A. Is the Law’s Function To Promote Progress? 
Honoring the IP Clause’s external limitations requires an 
understanding of when Congress is seeking to promote the progress 
of science and useful arts to help determine whether a given law 
should be understood to be within the IP Clause’s purview.202 This 
Section explores how to understand the first part of the IP Clause. 
Broken down, “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” 
generally refers to the goal of encouraging the advancement of 
systematic knowledge, cultural knowledge, and technology. I then 
work out how to assess whether a law has this end and thus falls 
within the scope of the IP Clause, meaning that it may use only the IP 
Clause’s specified means. 
According to the Supreme Court, “to promote” as used in the IP 
Clause means “‘to stimulate,’ ‘to encourage,’ or ‘to induce.’”203 Most 
commentators understand “progress” to mean advancement.204 As 
Professor Solum explains further, “progress” can be understood 
either as “advancement of learning [with a] focus on the results of 
scientific activity” or as “encouraging the activity itself [with a] focus 
on the process itself.”205 The first understanding can further mean 
improvement in a knowledge base’s quality or quantity. 
Rejecting an approach like Professor Solum’s, Professor Malla 
Pollack concludes on the basis of some historical linguistic evidence 
that “progress” means spread, diffusion, or distribution.206 She rejects 
Solum’s possible meanings in large part because under those 
meanings, she argues that “to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts” would have the same meaning as “to promote science and 
useful arts.”207 Pollack’s objection, however, is unpersuasive. The 
former phrase might straightforwardly be understood to mean that 
the Framers wanted to provide Congress the power to promote—
both directly and indirectly—the movement of science and useful arts 
in forward directions. This capacious ambition would not have been 
communicated by the latter language. Moreover, as Solum observes, 
 
 202. Cf. Solum, supra note 13, at 3 (“[T]he Copyright Clause requires that Congress pursue 
the goal of promoting the progress of science.”).  
 203. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).  
 204. E.g., Solum, supra note 13, at 45; Walterscheid, supra note 123, at 93; Walterscheid, 
supra note 19, at 376.  
 205. Solum, supra note 13, at 45–46. 
 206. Pollack, supra note 19, at 755–57, 794–95, 809. 
 207. Id. at 788–94. 
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the linguistic evidence Pollack presents is consistent with his favored 
understanding and in fact represents the more usual understanding of 
the term “progress.”208 I thus presume that Solum’s understanding is 
correct, although my framework would also work with Pollack’s 
definition. 
“Science” as it appears in the IP Clause did not originally have 
the meaning contemporary Americans associate with it—biology, 
chemistry, and the like. Instead, at the time of the Framing, science 
meant knowledge or learning, particularly of the kind that is 
systematic and of enduring value.209 That meaning makes particular 
sense in light of the fact that one of James Madison’s four 
constitutional proposals that yielded the IP Clause sought “the 
advancement of useful knowledge.”210 For the most part, this goal of 
advancement corresponds to what the Constitution encourages in 
copyright law: the production of cultural goods and knowledge. 
The term “useful arts,” confusingly enough, has nothing to do 
with cultural or fine arts. Rather, at the time of the Framing, it meant 
“helpful or valuable trades,” such as mechanical and civil 
engineering.211 Useful arts were understood to be skills that were 
practical rather than theoretical.212 They were principally what 
modern Americans have come to understand as technology,213 and 
they are what patent law is intended to promote. 
In sum, then, the evidence seems to show that a law is about 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts if it seeks to 
encourage advancement in areas of systematic knowledge, including 
cultural knowledge or technology. 
This understanding provides a definition to help assess whether a 
law is focused on promoting the progress of science and useful arts so 
 
 208. See Solum, supra note 13, at 46–47 (“[G]iven that the common-sense interpretation of 
the term ‘progress’ involves a figurative use, the prevalence of the underlying literal use only 
reinforces the possibility that the term was used in the common figurative sense.”). 
 209. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125 & n.46 (2002); see also Solum, supra note 
13, at 3 (“[Th]e meaning of science that best coheres with the constitutional text and the original 
understanding can be glossed as systematic knowledge or learning of enduring value . . . .”); id. 
at 51–52 (identifying the earliest federal copyright law’s reference to “encouragement of 
learning” as a synonym for “promot[ing] the Progress of science” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 210. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
 211. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 209, at 126. 
 212. Id. at 128. 
 213. Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 819 (2010). 
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as to tell whether Congress must respect the IP Clause’s external 
limitations. But observers have many ways with which to measure 
whether a law has this purpose, such as by gauging different 
legislators’ views or by looking to legislation’s stated purposes. 
Canvassing different legislators’ views is very slippery, as assigning a 
unified purpose to a multimember body is difficult.214 At the other 
extreme, looking conclusively to a law’s stated purpose—or, similarly, 
to its stated constitutional authority—gives Congress the easy escape 
valve of stating one purpose—or power—when in fact it has another 
in mind. Relying too much on this measurement would permit 
Congress to evade the IP Clause’s external limitations. Another 
possible test would be to investigate whether a law actually has the 
effect of promoting the progress of science and useful arts. Such a test 
is not ideal, however, both because judging legislation’s actual effect 
can be difficult at the outset and because courts might not be 
institutionally competent to make such a determination.215 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has emphasized in numerous cases 
that Congress should not be second-guessed on whether its laws 
enacted under the IP Clause actually promote the progress of science 
and useful arts.216 
Instead, I suggest that the optimal way to measure whether a law 
aims to promote the progress of science and useful arts is to assess its 
structural purpose. This approach is consistent with the way the 
Supreme Court typically evaluates a law’s purpose to determine its 
constitutionality, including in the context of intellectual property.217 In 
Eldred, the Court reasoned that a helpful mode of analysis was to 
 
 214. See William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 171, 173 (2000) (“[T]he concept of a single Congress producing legislation is 
undoubtedly a fiction.”). 
 215. Cf. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2334 (arguing for deferential review of 
“congressional legislation affecting intellectual property . . . because of concerns about 
institutional competence and respect for majoritarian decisionmaking”). 
 216. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (“It is 
for Congress to determine if the present system of design and utility patents is ineffectual in 
promoting the useful arts in the context of industrial design.”). 
 217. See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1788 
(2008) (“[C]ourts . . . had long been willing to consider some objective indicia of legislative 
purpose in deciding whether a statute was even superficially valid.”); see also David L. Franklin, 
Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 90–91 
(2006) (“[A]n understanding of constitutional meaning that includes a requirement of legitimate 
legislative purpose—in short, a judicial concern with the commercial ends or aims of the 
challenged statute as a whole—lies beneath the doctrinal surface [of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence].”).  
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assess a law’s purpose structurally.218 In Gibbons, the Court assessed 
the relevant law’s constitutionality by reasoning that its structural 
purpose was to allocate resources in a bankruptcy situation and that it 
must therefore comply with the Bankruptcy Clause’s limitations.219 
Starting with McCulloch v. Maryland,220 numerous Court decisions 
also suggest that an analysis of structural purpose is essential to 
ensure that Congress is acting within its powers.221 
As Professor John Manning notes, “Few would deny the 
possibility of gleaning a statute’s overall purpose from its structure or 
from the aims suggested by the text itself.”222 Although reasonable 
minds might differ as to a law’s structural purpose, the law ultimately 
passed by Congress often gives significant clues as to the purpose or 
power used. For example, relevant pieces of information include the 
intended effects or causes of the legislation, the stated effects or 
causes, and the statute’s desired placement alongside other laws with 
a similar purpose or power. 
This reasoning suggests that if Congress is acting with the 
structural purpose of promoting the progress of science and useful 
arts, it must comply with the IP Clause’s means. If it employs other 
means for that purpose, it is acting beyond its powers. 
How, though, should courts analyze laws that have multiple 
material purposes? For example, a law providing copyright or patent 
protection to foreign creators might be aimed at promoting the 
progress of science and useful arts, but it might also be aimed at 
promoting interstate and foreign commerce. Or a law regulating 
intellectual property pursuant to a treaty obligation of the United 
States might be directed both at promoting the progress of science 
 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 139–47. 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 156–60. 
 220. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  
 221. See id. at 423 (“Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which 
are prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its 
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would 
become the painful duty of this tribunal . . . to say that such an act was not the law of the land.”); 
see also Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885) (“[T]he rule is general with reference to 
the enactments of all legislative bodies that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the 
legislators in passing them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferrible 
from their operation, considered with reference to the condition of the country and existing 
legislation.”); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884) (looking to the structural 
purpose of a federal law levying a per-passenger fee on vessels from foreign ports to determine 
whether the law was an exercise of Congress’s commerce power).  
 222. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2408 n.75 (2003). 
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and useful arts and American foreign-relations interests. Congress, in 
such cases, has multiple legitimate constitutional interests, and those 
interests may point in competing directions. For example, foreign-
relations or trade interests might suggest that a law ought to extend 
beyond the IP Clause’s means, whereas intellectual-property interests 
would counsel otherwise. In these cases, there are competing 
considerations. On the one hand, the IP Clause, as demonstrated 
herein, externally limits Congress’s other powers. On the other, 
Congress can have purposes other than intellectual-property 
regulation in mind in enacting a law. 
To resolve these competing considerations, a presumption 
framework is helpful to ensure that if Congress is evading the IP 
Clause’s means, it is doing so because it feels compelled to do so due 
to competing constitutional interests.223 That is, laws that have a 
purpose of promoting the progress of science and useful arts ought to 
be presumed unconstitutional unless clear and convincing evidence 
shows that Congress considered superseding the IP Clause’s means 
important due to other legitimate, material constitutional interests, 
such as foreign relations or commerce. Of course, these other 
interests must be legitimate and not merely asserted as a sham to 
bypass the IP Clause’s external limitations.224 Otherwise, laws with 
multiple purposes would easily evade the IP Clause’s limited means, 
which together operate as a sensible restriction on Congress’s 
authority.225 
This presumption framework would, as Professors Samuel 
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes note in a different context, place “the 
judicial emphasis on second-order issues of appropriate institutions 
and processes, through which courts seek mainly to ensure that the 
 
 223. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Meriwether Lewis, the Air Force, and the Surge: The Problem of 
Constitutional Settlement, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 649, 653 (2008) (“[O]ur Constitution must 
incorporate not only the text and the judicial constructions of it, but the accommodations 
reached by the political branches in the difficult task of actually administering a constitutional 
democracy.”). 
 224. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02, 615 (2000) (striking down as an 
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power a federal law that provided a “civil 
remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence,” despite congressional findings that such 
violence substantially affected interstate commerce, because Congress had “rel[ied] so heavily 
on a method of reasoning that [the Court] ha[d] already rejected as unworkable”). 
 225. Cf. M. David Lepofsky, The Canadian Judicial Approach to Equality Rights: Freedom 
Ride or Roller Coaster?, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 189 (1992) (refusing to distinguish 
between laws with a particular single purpose and those with multiple purposes, “lest a 
legislature be able to piggy-back legislative purposes to enable it to do that which the 
Constitution forbids”). 
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right institutional process supports the tradeoff between [competing 
constitutional interests] at issue.”226 This process-oriented approach 
would take cognizance of Congress’s better placement, as compared 
to courts’, to evaluate how to trade off between multiple policy 
interests when more than one constitutional authority is at stake in 
the context of intellectual property.227 This presumption framework 
would transform the constitutional inquiry into one of statutory 
interpretation, one with which courts ought to feel more 
comfortable.228 
This presumption of unconstitutionality ought to be harder to 
overcome in certain circumstances than in others. In particular, 
Congress might enact laws that subvert the IP Clause’s means, such as 
by enacting perpetual copyright protection, granting patent rights to 
someone other than the inventor, or granting protection to works that 
are neither writings nor discoveries.229 Such laws would contravene 
the IP Clause’s external limitations most directly, by upsetting the 
calibrated balance of the IP Clause, a balance between a grant of 
incentives to authors and inventors and a broader public benefit.230 In 
such situations, the presumption of unconstitutionality ought to be 
extremely hard to overcome. By comparison, the presumption ought 
to be somewhat easier to overcome for a law whose means merely are 
not contained in the IP Clause, such as funding for scientific 
research.231 
In sum, then, legislation with the material structural purpose of 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts must use only the 
 
 226. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 1, 44–45 (2004). 
 227. Cf. id. (making a parallel observation in regard to bilateral institutional actions that 
trade off between liberty and security). 
 228. This transformation happens in many areas of the law, including extraterritoriality of 
domestic laws, federal preemption of state laws, and treaty obligations. See Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007) (“The presumption that United States law governs 
domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in patent law.”); Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that there is a presumption against 
federal preemption of state laws unless “that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”); 
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral 
commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.”). 
 229. Cf. infra Part III.B. 
 230. See supra Part I.D. 
 231. Cf. infra Part III.E. 
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means specified in the IP Clause to effectuate that end. If such a law 
uses other means, it is unconstitutional. Moreover, if a law has 
multiple legitimate constitutional purposes, one of which is to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, it should be 
presumed to be unconstitutional if it does not comply with the IP 
Clause’s means, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that 
Congress has chosen to supersede those means because of overriding 
interests pursuant to another legitimate constitutional power. 
The means specified in the IP Clause require “securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”232 In relevant part, then, as 
elaborated in the next Section and in Part III, to comply with those 
means, a law must include a grant of an exclusive right that is limited 
in time to someone who qualifies as an author of something that is his 
or her writing, or to someone who qualifies as an inventor of 
something that is his or her invention. 
B. Potential Conflicts 
Before delving in the next Part into some federal laws of dubious 
constitutionality in light of the IP Clause’s external limitations, I first 
analyze the four constitutional powers most likely to conflict with, 
and to provide cover for evading, the Clause’s external limitations: 
the commerce, spending, necessary-and-proper, and treaty powers. 
After setting out the nature of these possible collisions—in the simple 
case of a law’s having the single purpose of promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts—I return to the presumption framework. I 
return to that framework to examine how extensively it might efface 
the IP Clause’s external limitations in light of a nuanced 
understanding of the varied constitutional interests that might be 
invoked in enacting a law. 
1. Commerce Clause.  Although most think the Commerce 
Clause, as originally understood, described only a narrow power,233 its 
reach has grown to be extensive. The Commerce Clause has been 
described by the Supreme Court as authorizing three broad classes of 
regulation: (1) laws that “regulate the channels of interstate 
commerce”; (2) laws that “regulate and protect the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce”; and (3) laws that “regulate activities that 
 
 232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 233. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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substantially affect interstate commerce.”234 Included in this third 
category are “purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class 
of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”235 
Furthermore, the Court has said that “Congress can regulate purely 
intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not 
produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of 
activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that 
commodity.”236 Although these categories might betray some 
limitations on Congress’s commerce power, the power is, 
nevertheless, quite extensive. 
But for the IP Clause’s external limitations, most intellectual-
property legislation could likely be enacted under the cover of this 
expansive understanding of the Commerce Clause. Artistic, scientific, 
and technological works that are encouraged by intellectual-property 
legislation can typically be linked to activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce. 
If a law were aimed at promoting the progress of science and 
useful arts but failed to comply with the IP Clause’s means, then the 
federal government would be likely to defend that law by reference to 
the Commerce Clause.237 As the discussion in Part I reveals, however, 
Congress is acting outside of its constitutional authority when it 
attempts to use the Commerce Clause to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts while not restricting itself to the IP Clause’s 
means, unless Congress can show clearly and convincingly that it had 
legitimate material interests under the Commerce Clause that 
necessitated a transgression of the IP Clause’s limited means. 
The collision between the Commerce and IP Clauses is direct. 
The other three powers that might collide with the IP Clause—the 
spending, necessary-and-proper, and treaty powers—to which I will 
now turn, clash less obviously or directly, if at all. 
2. Spending Clause.  Another constitutional provision that might 
conflict with the IP Clause’s external limitations is Article I’s 
Spending Clause. That clause authorizes Congress to “lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
 
 234. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005). 
 235. Id. at 17. 
 236. Id. at 18. 
 237. For one example, see infra Part III.B. 
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the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”238 
Early history—particularly congressional worries about funding a 
research expedition239—suggests a great potential for conflict between 
the Spending and IP Clauses. 
As mentioned in Part I.B, in the nation’s early history, 
commentators held differing views on the Spending Clause’s reach. In 
1791, Alexander Hamilton submitted to Congress his Report on the 
Subject of Manufactures, in which he argued that Congress had the 
authority under the Spending Clause to award “[p]ecuniary bounties” 
to encourage American manufacturing.240 Hamilton’s argument was 
meant to counter congressional opposition to using means beyond 
those elaborated in the IP Clause to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts.241 Hamilton claimed that the Spending Clause could 
be used to spend for the general welfare, even if the spending was for 
a purpose not otherwise enumerated in the Constitution as a 
congressional power.242 Nonetheless, Hamilton thought that spending 
could not be used to evade express or fairly implied limitations on 
congressional powers.243 Given his proposal to fund manufacturing 
endeavors, however, Hamilton apparently did not find the limitations 
on the IP Clause to rise to that level. In fact, Hamilton’s expansive 
view of the Spending Clause seems to have stemmed in part from his 
constrictive understanding of the reach of the IP Clause.244 
Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison challenged 
Hamilton’s view. They understood the Spending Clause to allow for 
congressional spending that is consistent with the other enumerated 
powers.245 Pursuant to this understanding, and given the IP Clause’s 
 
 238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 116–27. 
 240. Hamilton, supra note 106, at 298, 303–04 (“No objection ought to arise to this 
construction from a supposition that it would imply a power to do whatever else should appear 
to Congress conducive to the General Welfare. A power to appropriate money with this latitude 
which is granted too in express terms would not carry a power to do any other thing, not 
authorised in the constitution, either expressly or by fair implication.”). Hamilton appeared to 
be suggesting rewards for those who had made successful inventions, rather than general 
funding of scientific innovation. Walterscheid, supra note 123, at 110. 
 241. Walterscheid, supra note 123, at 101–03. 
 242. Hamilton, supra note 106, at 303–04. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See Walterscheid, supra note 123, at 108–09 (noting that Hamilton’s views were 
“predicated on a narrow interpretation of the language of the intellectual property clause”). 
 245. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817), reprinted in 15 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 131, 133 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907); Letter from James 
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external limitations, Congress would have lacked authority to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts through grants. 
Jefferson and Madison’s view prevailed until the New Deal era. 
Congress did not fund research and development in its early years.246 
But the Supreme Court later adopted Hamilton’s view in 1936, in 
a case247 analyzing the constitutionality of processing and floor-stock 
taxes under Congress’s Agricultural Adjustment Act.248 The Court in 
that case held that “public funds may be appropriated ‘to provide for 
the general welfare of the United States.’”249 Rejecting Jefferson and 
Madison’s view, the Court stated that “the power of Congress to 
authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not 
limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the 
Constitution,” but rather by the confines of the Spending Clause.250 
The Court has since indicated that “[i]ncident to [the spending] 
power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds,” even for “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s 
‘enumerated legislative fields,’” subject to several limitations.251 The 
first of these limitations is that the “exercise of the spending power 
must be in pursuit of the ‘general [W]elfare.’”252 Second, “other 
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the 
conditional grant of federal funds.”253 As explained by the Court, “the 
power may not be used to induce [recipients] to engage in activities 
that would themselves be unconstitutional,”254 nor may it be used to 
prohibit “the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is 
not empowered to achieve directly.”255 These ostensible caveats 
notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has tended to interpret the 
 
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 18, 1800), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 111, at 347, 357.  
 246. See Walterscheid, supra note 123, at 113–14 (“Regardless of Washington’s views, both 
Jefferson and Madison rather quickly challenged Hamilton’s broad interpretation of the 
spending power under the general welfare clause, and Congress was not generally disposed to 
adopt it for the purpose of either creating a national university or funding R&D . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)).  
 247. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936). 
 248. Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), invalidated by United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).  
 249. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65. 
 250. Id. at 66. 
 251. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 65).  
 252. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). 
 253. Id. at 208. 
 254. Id. at 210.  
 255. Id. 
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Spending Clause expansively, ensuring that even these limitations are 
narrowly applied.256 
Although Madison and Jefferson may in fact have had the more 
appropriate understanding of the Spending Clause, particularly in 
view of early congressional practice, the Supreme Court’s holdings 
seem to foreclose the return of that view. This reality, however, does 
not necessarily mean that Congress may spend to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts in violation of the IP Clause’s 
means. Much in the same fashion that the Commerce Clause is 
constrained by the IP Clause’s limited means, a strong case can be 
made that Congress cannot rely on the Spending Clause to initiate 
spending to promote the progress of science and useful arts. Even 
accepting that the Spending Clause is an independent power, one 
might still see the IP Clause as providing an external limit on that 
Article I power.257 In fact, the Supreme Court’s understanding that 
other constitutional limitations can restrict the Spending Clause’s 
reach could be understood to prohibit congressional spending to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts using means other 
than those laid out in the IP Clause. Nonetheless, given the Supreme 
Court’s expansive understanding of the Spending Clause over time, 
the Court might not as readily find that the IP Clause’s limitations do 
in fact inhibit Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause. 
3. Necessary and Proper Clause.  Another broad constitutional 
power conferred upon Congress permits the legislature “To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”258 My discussion here explores the 
potential of the Necessary and Proper Clause to conflict with the IP 
Clause’s external limitations. 
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause supplements the more specific grants of power to Congress by 
conferring on Congress the “broad power to enact laws that are 
 
 256. David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1197, 1198–99 (2004). 
 257. But see Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1174–75 (“[There exists a] clearly 
constitutional method by which Congress can direct public monies to the copyright industry: 
outright subsidies.”). 
 258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial 
exercise.’”259 As the Court explained in McCulloch v. Maryland, 
“necessary” does not require that the action be “absolutely 
necessary.”260 Rather, as McCulloch explained, “Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which 
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.”261 A law is proper under this Clause, 
then, if it “constitutes a means that is rationally related to the 
implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”262 
Does this power enable Congress to legislate to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts beyond the means specified in the 
IP Clause? Not wholly. Rather, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
suggests that, at most, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives 
Congress the power to legislate to help implement the IP Clause. 
Because the IP Clause specifies the limited means by which Congress 
may legislate to achieve a specified end, Congress can use the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, but only by legislating in ways that support the means 
specified in the IP Clause. The Clause does not allow Congress to use 
other means more broadly to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts. That is, Congress can establish a patent office to examine 
patents before granting them and can require or encourage deposits 
of copyrighted materials in a central repository, even though these 
means are not literally within the IP Clause’s scope. What is less clear 
is whether Congress can use other means further afield from the 
implementation of copyright and patent laws. I return to this issue in 
the next Part as I consider federal funding of artistic and scientific 
works. 
This analysis is consonant with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a source of 
congressional power. That is, congressional exercises of power under 
the Clause are not constricted by the IP Clause insofar as they seek to 
help execute the means and ends of the IP Clause. Consider that in 
 
 259. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413, 418 (1819)) (upholding Congress’s power to commit 
mentally ill sex offenders civilly after they have completed their criminal sentences).  
 260. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414–15. 
 261. Id. at 421. 
 262. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956. 
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McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall indicated that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause cannot be invoked by Congress to enact a law that is 
forbidden by the Constitution, even if the Clause would otherwise 
permit it.263 Because, as this Article argues, Congress is forbidden 
from using means other than those laid out in the IP Clause to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, in certain instances 
Congress may likewise be forbidden from pursuing the same goal 
generally via the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress may, 
however, use the Necessary and Proper Clause to support the means 
it employs in service of the IP Clause’s ends. 
4. Treaty Powers.  The federal government’s treaty powers also 
might come into conflict with the IP Clause’s external limitations. As 
I discuss here, the federal government’s traditional treaty power is 
not a congressional power in the way that the commerce, spending, 
and necessary-and-proper powers are. When the federal government 
is exercising this traditional power, a reasonable argument can be 
made for the proposition that the IP Clause does not externally limit 
this power. This argument is somewhat less powerful, however, with 
respect to non-self-executing treaties, which Congress implements 
through legislation. Furthermore, the IP Clause even more likely 
imposes external limits on Congress when it enacts congressional-
executive agreements. 
According to Article II of the Constitution, the president “shall 
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”264 
The Supreme Court, in Missouri v. Holland,265 approved a broad 
understanding of this treaty power. In upholding a treaty between the 
United States and Great Britain regulating the killing of migratory 
birds, the Court rejected the argument that “what an act of Congress 
could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the 
States, a treaty cannot do.”266 That is, even if Congress lacks authority 
to regulate the killing of migratory birds with its Article I, Section 8 
powers—particularly the Commerce Clause—that fact alone does not 
 
 263. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. 
 264. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 265. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 266. Id. at 432. 
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prohibit the federal government from exercising its Article II 
treatymaking powers to accomplish the same effect.267 
Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court recognized in Reid v. 
Covert,268 the Article II treaty power does have limitations. In that 
case, the Court struck down an executive agreement between the 
United States and Great Britain that had “permitted United States’ 
military courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses 
committed in Great Britain by American servicemen or their 
dependents” because the agreement forced the wives of soldiers to be 
tried in military court, depriving them of their Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights.269 The Court reasoned that “[t]he prohibitions of 
the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the 
National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive 
or by the Executive and the Senate combined.”270 In other words, the 
Constitution’s prohibitions on governmental power trump the treaty 
power.271 
When a treaty passed pursuant to the Article II treatymaking 
power seeks to promote the progress of science and useful arts, one 
could make a plausible case that the IP Clause does not externally 
limit the treaty to using only the means specified in the IP Clause 
itself.272 As Professor Graeme Dinwoodie observes, “[T]he Treaty 
Clause presents a weaker case for the imposition of structural 
constraints not only because the limits in the [IP] Clause appear 
unrelated to the structure of government, but also because the 
independent exercise of the Treaty Clause appears affirmatively 
supportive of a governmental vision contained in the Constitution.”273 
Specifically, the treaty power is situated among the president’s 
 
 267. Id. at 432–35. 
 268. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
 269. Id. at 15–18; accord id. at 49 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
 270. Id. at 17 (plurality opinion). 
 271. Id. at 17–18. 
 272. Cf. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An (Inter)Nationalist 
Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 362–63 (2007) (arguing that 
copyright laws passed pursuant to the treaty powers are likely to be valid if they “seek[] to 
ensure domestic compliance with real international obligations” and are “adopted through a 
process involving real political checks on legislative lawmaking,” even if they do not comply 
with the IP Clause’s means); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: 
Are There Limits on the United States’ Ability To Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
1, 4 (2004) (arguing that the IP Clause should not limit the Treaty Clause when the subject 
matter of a given treaty is international). 
 273. Dinwoodie, supra note 272, at 372. 
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powers in Article II, not Congress’s powers in Article I, Section 8. It 
specifies a treatymaking process that involves the president and the 
Senate, not the whole Congress. As such, one might question whether 
the external limitations that the IP Clause imposes on Congress’s 
other powers also restrict the treaty power, given that treatymaking is 
not a congressional power, even if the Senate is constitutionally 
integral to the process. 
The question can be restated more generally: Does the IP Clause 
establish external limitations only on congressional legislation—as 
with the legislation passed under the Commerce Clause in Missouri v. 
Holland—or more broadly on federal governmental action, including 
the exercise of the treaty power—just as the Sixth Amendment 
created such a restriction in Reid v. Covert? The evidence set forth in 
Part I does not seem to shed light directly on the intersection between 
treatymaking and the IP Clause. Structurally speaking, the IP 
Clause—situated in Article I—might limit Congress’s powers when 
the legislature acts bicamerally, but not the Article II treatymaking 
powers employed jointly by the president and the Senate.274 Although 
this structural analysis might seem formalistic, an exercise of the 
Article II treatymaking powers is designed to ensure that the 
president and Senate represent the country’s interests broadly with 
regard to other countries, as compared with the more regionally 
grounded House of Representatives, which by design has a greater 
hand in Article I legislation.275 As Professor Dinwoodie notes, “[T]he 
values that lawmakers might need to pursue at the international level, 
or the means through which they might pursue them, might depart 
from those ends or means that are desirable domestically.”276 
Still, the argument that the IP Clause does not limit treaties is 
not airtight. For one thing, if the argument is correct, then the federal 
government could easily circumvent the IP Clause’s limitations 
through treatymaking instead of Article I legislation.277 Moreover, the 
 
 274. Id. at 381. 
 275. Id. at 379. 
 276. Id. 
 277. See id. at 378 (“[W]hat is the point of limits in one clause if these can easily be 
circumvented by reliance on another broader grant?”); Richard B. Graves III, Globalization, 
Treaty Powers, and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Clause, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 199, 210 (2003) (“[T]he federal government could enter into a treaty for the purpose of 
circumventing limitations on Congressional lawmaking authority. There is good reason to 
believe that the scope of the treaty enacted for this purpose would not be restricted to external 
matters.”). 
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historical evidence discussed in Part I shows that the IP Clause was 
believed in one circumstance to limit externally a power exercised 
under Article IV, beyond Article I.278 It might similarly limit a power 
exercised under Article II; but then, the Article II treaty power is 
granted to the president as well as to the Senate, whereas the Article 
IV power in that historical example was provided solely to Congress. 
Furthermore, even if Article II self-executing treaties are not 
limited externally by the IP Clause, non-self-executing treaties might 
be so limited. Although both kinds of treaties are made pursuant to 
Article II,279 the former become law without any need for Congress to 
activate them via Article I,280 whereas the latter come into effect only 
if Congress uses Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause to enact 
appropriate legislation.281 Therefore, one might argue that whenever 
Congress uses its Article I powers to implement non-self-executing 
treaties—the only powers it has at its disposal to do so—the IP Clause 
externally limits the legislature to the Clause’s specified means.282 The 
reasoning goes that whereas the non-self-executing treaty in Holland 
could be implemented via the Necessary and Proper Clause even 
though the Commerce Clause was unavailable, the same could not be 
said of the IP Clause, because unlike the Commerce Clause, the IP 
Clause externally limits the other Article I powers. This argument for 
different treatment, however, is weak, primarily because of the 
strange state of affairs that would result if Article II were to allow the 
United States to take on a treaty obligation that it could not then 
implement via Article I. 
Regardless, my analysis suggests that good reasons exist to think 
that the IP Clause externally limits the government’s power to enact 
treaty-like congressional-executive agreements. A congressional-
executive agreement is an agreement negotiated by the president with 
one or more other countries, which is then adopted bicamerally by 
 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 110–12. 
 279. Benjamin Beiter, Note, Beyond Medellín: Reconsidering Federalism Limits on the 
Treaty Power, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1163, 1194 n.206 (2010). 
 280. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356–57 (2008).  
 281. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). Some scholars argue that Holland was 
wrongly decided and that Congress should be allowed to implement non–self-executing treaties 
pursuant only to Article I powers other than the Necessary and Proper Clause. E.g., Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1880–92 (2005); 
Beiter, supra note 279, at 1194.  
 282. See supra Part III. 
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Congress like ordinary Article I legislation.283 Assuming that 
congressional-executive agreements are a constitutional form of 
lawmaking,284 they are enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8 rather 
than Article II.285 As such, the accepted understanding is that these 
agreements are subject to Article I’s limitations, even when Article II 
treaties are not.286 These agreements would thus be limited externally 
by the IP Clause to using the means provided in that Clause. 
The predominant international agreements in intellectual 
property have been implemented bicamerally through Article I 
legislation, either because the underlying treaties were non-self-
executing or because they were forms of congressional-executive 
agreement. For instance, the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),287 which sets 
minimum standards for intellectual-property laws, was implemented 
by the United States as a congressional-executive agreement.288 This 
Article’s reasoning provides a strong case that the TRIPS agreement, 
having been enacted pursuant to Article I, is externally limited by the 
IP Clause. 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works,289 which governs copyright law, is a non-self-executing treaty 
 
 283. Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 406, 422 
(1989). 
 284. Compare, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 799, 913–14 (1995) (arguing that they are), with Tribe, supra note 27, at 1249–51 
(expressing skepticism). 
 285. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 
119 YALE L.J. 140, 259–60, 261–63 (2009); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality 
of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 763–64 (2001). 
 286. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Medellín and the Future of International Delegation, 118 
YALE L.J. 1712, 1747 (2009) (“[C]ongressional-executive agreements, dependent on Article I 
powers, are not interchangeable with treaties on matters reaching beyond the enumerated 
powers.”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the 
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 691 n.397 (2008) (“The option of a 
congressional-executive agreement is unavailable for agreements that address matters beyond 
Congress’s legislative power under Article I.”). 
 287. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 288. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); see also Memorandum for the United States 
Trade Representative, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,263, 67,267 (Dec. 20, 1993) (describing the president’s 
negotiations with Congress regarding the agreement).  
 289. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].  
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that the Senate ratified and Congress implemented in 1988.290 As just 
discussed, the arguments about whether congressional 
implementation of this non-self-executing treaty should be limited by 
the IP Clause’s external limitations are weakly colorable. 
In sum, the federal government’s treaty powers and the IP 
Clause’s external limits may collide. One would most expect a 
collision when Congress enacts a congressional-executive agreement; 
one would expect it less when Congress implements a non-self-
executing treaty; and one would least expect it when the federal 
government enacts a self-executing treaty. 
*          *          * 
Although other powers might come into conflict with the IP 
Clause’s external limits, the commerce, spending, necessary-and-
proper, and treaty powers are those most likely to clash with them 
because those powers are broad and are responsible for much federal 
lawmaking. Each is capable of being invoked in ways that the IP 
Clause would seem to restrain. 
This Part’s analysis has mostly assumed that enacted laws have a 
singular purpose and that collisions between the IP Clause’s external 
limitations and other constitutional powers take place when Congress 
uses those powers as a cover for promoting the progress of science 
and useful arts using means not authorized in the IP Clause. A 
nuanced analysis, however, allows for the possibility that Congress 
might have legitimate interests in enacting legislation in addition to 
promoting the progress of science and useful arts.291 Many of these 
legitimate interests are likely to be pursuant to those powers just 
discussed that are likely to collide with the IP Clause’s external 
limitations. In those instances, the presumption framework outlined 
in Section A should apply to permit Congress to enact legislation in 
spite of the IP Clause’s external limitations, as long as clear and 
convincing evidence exists that Congress considered those other 
interests legitimate enough to override the IP Clause’s external 
limitations. As a practical matter, this framework might enable 
Congress to bypass the IP Clause’s external limitations whenever it 
wants merely by giving lip service to other more permissive 
 
 290. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 
2853, 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 note (2006)).  
 291. See supra Part II.A. 
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constitutional powers, such as the Commerce Clause or the treaty 
powers, to override the IP Clause’s limited means. This situation 
might sometimes happen, as unfortunate as it may be. There is 
perhaps no better solution, however, given the recognition that 
Congress might have truly legitimate trade, foreign-relations, or other 
interests in enacting laws with the IP Clause’s ends that extend 
beyond its means. At worst, the presumption framework would force 
Congress to consider clearly—and one would hope carefully—
whether it is transgressing the IP Clause’s important external 
limitations. Moreover, because the presumption would be extremely 
difficult to overcome for laws whose means subvert the IP Clause’s 
means, those laws would be less likely to be deemed to be 
constitutional. 
Bearing this general analysis in mind, I now turn to an 
exploration of some existing federal laws that might be 
unconstitutional in light of the foregoing analysis. 
III.  UNCONSTITUTIONAL FEDERAL LAWS? 
For most of the nation’s history, few federal laws were passed 
that might even questionably transgress the limited means specified in 
the IP Clause. Whatever the cause—be it globalization, an expansive 
Commerce Clause, or recklessness—starting in the late twentieth 
century, Congress proposed or enacted a number of federal laws of 
dubious constitutionality in light of the IP Clause’s external 
limitations.292 This Part explores some of those laws—trade-secrecy, 
antibootlegging, copyright-restoration, and database-protection—
analyzing their constitutionality in light of the analytical framework 
proposed in Part II. This Part also investigates the constitutionality of 
federal laws establishing the federal funding of scientific and artistic 
works. As the analysis in this Part demonstrates, the framework 
proposed by this Article is straightforward in its application. Even 
when the conclusion to be drawn is not obvious, use of the framework 
focuses and sharpens the analysis. 
A. Trade Secrecy 
This Section describes Congress’s legislation protecting trade 
secrets from misappropriation. I show that this law has a strong 
 
 292. Cf. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1168 n.359 (observing that the earlier absence of 
questionable laws “might itself be evidence of the unconstitutionality of such statutes”). 
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structural purpose of promoting the progress of science and useful 
arts, but that it does not comply with the IP Clause’s limited means. 
Moreover, although the law also has a weighty legitimate purpose of 
promoting trade and interstate commerce, Congress did not leave 
clear evidence that it thought commerce interests ought to take 
precedence over the IP Clause’s external limitations. As such, the 
legislation is constitutionally problematic. Given that President 
Obama’s Justice Department has called for greater use of this law in 
prosecuting trade-secret misappropriation,293 its constitutional status is 
ever more important. 
In 1996, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act,294 
providing the first general federal protection for trade secrecy.295 
Among other things, it provides that 
[w]hoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or 
included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or 
foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the 
owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure 
any owner of that trade secret, knowingly . . . [misappropriates] 
shall . . . be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 
years, or both.296 
The law defines trade secrets as  
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, 
economic, or engineering information . . . if— (A) the owner thereof 
has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value . . . from 
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable 
through proper means by, the public.297 
The Senate report on the bill explains that this law has two 
purposes: “to promote the development and lawful utilization of 
United States proprietary economic information produced for, or 
 
 293. Gary G. Grindler, Aggressive IP Enforcement Is a Must, NAT’L L.J. (May 3, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202453202819. At the time he wrote this 
article, Gary Grindler was the acting deputy attorney general and chairman of the Department 
of Justice’s Task Force on Intellectual Property. Id.  
 294. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2006)). 
 295. Other federal laws protect trade secrets narrowly and for different purposes, such as to 
guard against federal employees’ unauthorized disclosure of certain confidential information. 
E.g.,18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2006).  
 296. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2006). 
 297. Id. § 1839(3). 
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placed in, interstate and foreign commerce by protecting it 
from . . . misappropriation” and “to secure to authors and inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”298 The 
first purpose corresponds with Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause, and the second corresponds with Congress’s 
power under the IP Clause.299 The report explains further that 
Congress has heretofore confined its protection of intellectual 
property to patented and copyrighted material. With this legislation, 
Congress extends the protection of Federal law to the equally 
important area of proprietary economic information. During the 
course of the Committee’s hearings, we documented that 
proprietary economic information is vital to the prosperity of the 
American economy, that it is increasingly the target of thieves, and 
that our current laws are inadequate to punish people who steal the 
information.300 
As the report confirms, then, with the Economic Espionage Act, the 
Senate expressly set out to protect a broader swath of material in a 
manner akin to Congress’s protection of patentable and copyrightable 
material. Although the law is primarily occupied with promoting the 
country’s economic status, it is also focused on safeguarding 
information that might otherwise be protected by existing copyright 
and patent law.301 
The Economic Espionage Act comports with a general 
understanding of trade-secret laws’ purposes. As the Supreme Court 
has reasoned, along with “maintenance of standards of commercial 
ethics,” a primary purpose of trade-secrecy protection is “the 
encouragement of invention.”302 Scholars emphasize trade secrecy’s 
important role in fostering scientific and technological innovation.303 
Like patent law, trade-secrecy protection encourages investment in 
scientific and technological research by “giv[ing] the developer of 
new and valuable information the right to restrict others from using it, 
 
 298. S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 2 (1996).  
 299. Id. at 4. 
 300. Id. at 5–6. 
 301. Id. at 14. 
 302. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
 303. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 311, 329–32 (2008). 
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and therefore the prospect of deriving supracompetitive profits from 
the information.”304 
This discussion indicates that the law’s structural effects are to 
protect economic development and to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts. As to the former effect, the law protects many 
things that are primarily helpful in facilitating commerce, such as 
customer lists and customer research.305 As to the latter, it promotes 
the progress of science and useful arts by encouraging investment in 
scientific and technological research because it authorizes punishment 
for those who misappropriate such information.306 In fact, nearly every 
reported judicial opinion resulting from a prosecution under this law 
seems to involve this latter variety of trade secret, the variety whose 
protection is intended to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts.307 Although courts and commentators have debated whether 
trade-secrecy protection interferes with patent law’s operation,308 few 
dispute that the two regimes have, in large part, the same aim: the 
constitutional end laid out in the IP Clause of promoting the progress 
of science and useful arts. As such, to the extent that the law is 
protecting scientific and technological information from 
misappropriation, it must comply with the IP Clause’s specified 
 
 304. Id. at 330. 
 305. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2006) (protecting “financial, business, [or] 
economic . . . information”). 
 306. See id. (protecting “scientific, technical, . . . or engineering information”). 
 307. See e.g., United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 540–44 (6th Cir. 2002) (scientific 
information about adhesives research); United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535, 536–37 (6th Cir. 
2001) (“new process for applying hard coatings to the laminate contact surfaces of caul plates”); 
United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 8–10 (1st Cir. 2000) (composition of veterinary diagnostic 
tests and research-and-development data); United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 191–92 (3d Cir. 
1998) (“processes, methods, and formulas for manufacturing Taxol, an anti-cancer drug”); 
United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“computer programs 
used to operate [a financial firm’s] high-frequency trading system”); United States v. Genovese, 
409 F. Supp. 2d 253, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (source code). 
 308. Compare Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166 (1989) 
(concluding that state unfair-competition and trade-secret laws are not inconsistent with patent 
law), and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474–93 (1974) (distinguishing between 
the federal exclusivity of the IP Clause and states’ ability to protect trade secrets and intellectual 
property), with Jeanne C. Fromer, Trade Secrecy in Willy Wonka’s Chocolate Factory, in THE 
LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 3, 6 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) (describing how the “central 
innovations in the candy industry” are protected by trade secrecy even when patent protection 
might be obtained), and Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial 
Perspective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 708 (1996) (noting that industrialists 
often prefer trade secrets, which “encompass some of the most valuable intellectual property”). 
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means unless clear and convincing evidence exists that commerce 
interests superseded the IP Clause’s external limitations. 
Federal trade-secrecy law does not confine itself to the Clause’s 
means. Putting aside the issue of whether the law’s criminal and 
injunctive relief confer exclusive rights on inventors309 as the IP 
Clause requires, the law provides protection of potentially unlimited 
duration. As long as the holder of a trade secret complies with the 
law’s secrecy requirements and as long as a third party does not 
uncover the secret by proper means, such as independent discovery or 
reverse engineering, the law’s protection endures.310 Because one can 
conceive of scenarios involving protected trade secrets in which 
protection would not endure for “limited Times,” the law contravenes 
the IP Clause’s prescribed means. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
Congress deliberately chose to contravene the IP Clause’s means to 
protect weightier commercial interests, suggesting that the 
presumption of unconstitutionality is not overcome here.311 
By contrast, former Professor Patry argues that federal trade-
secrecy laws are not constitutionally problematic under the IP 
Clause.312 Patry asserts that the purpose of trade-secrecy laws is 
distinct from that of patent and copyright laws: the goal of the former 
is to protect against industrial espionage, whereas the goal of the 
latter is to advance knowledge and technology.313 In Patry’s view, 
trade-secret laws do not protect “Writings” per se but rather protect 
 
 309. Professors Paul Heald and Suzanna Sherry think that federal trade-secrecy laws are 
constitutional. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1194–95. They also reason that the Economic 
Espionage Act does not establish exclusive rights, but rather merely supplements existing 
common-law remedies, and therefore does not fall within the ambit of the IP Clause’s 
limitations. Id. Yet if Professors Heald and Sherry are correct that trade-secrecy protection is 
not an exclusive right, then that premise supplies all the more reason for concluding that the law 
transgresses the IP Clause’s limited means of promoting innovation.  
 310. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1622 (2011) (“[T]rade secrecy protection can theoretically provide even 
more powerful incentives than patents because trade secrecy rights are potentially infinite in 
duration.”); David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public 
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 156–57 (2007) (“So long as the elements of trade secrecy are 
met, the right to keep a secret for an infinite period of time underscores the real power of 
enjoying trade secret protection.”). 
 311. Congress is less likely to provide this clear evidence absent an adopted framework 
encouraging it to do so. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561–63 (1995) (encouraging 
Congress to make express findings supporting a law’s link to interstate commerce by 
underscoring the findings’ relevance to a determination whether Congress acted permissibly 
within its commerce power).  
 312. Patry, supra note 17, at 394. 
 313. Id. 
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the right to be free from theft, especially because material that is 
reverse engineered—and thus that is available to the public without 
misappropriation—is not protectable as a trade secret.314 Because, 
according to Patry, these laws do not protect the secrets themselves so 
much as they protect this more abstract right to be free from theft, 
they are not within the reach of the IP Clause’s limitations and are 
thus constitutionally unproblematic.315 
This analysis is insufficiently nuanced. Trade-secrecy protection 
surely seeks to protect against industrial espionage, but the statute’s 
structural purpose also includes the goal of advancing knowledge and 
technology. As such, my framework turns the analysis of former 
Professor Patry on its head: if Patry is correct that the trade-secret 
statute does not protect “Writings,” then as a law aimed at promoting 
the progress of science and useful arts, it actually complies with one 
fewer of the IP Clause’s means. Thus, on former Professor Patry’s 
theory, trade-secret laws are constitutionally problematic for an 
additional reason. 
In sum, Congress’s incursion into trade-secret protection with the 
Economic Espionage Act is constitutionally problematic. The statute 
has a strong structural purpose of promoting the progress of science 
and useful arts, but it exceeds the IP Clause’s means. To the extent 
that Congress attempts to promote the IP Clause’s goals, it cannot use 
its other more expansive powers, such as its power under the 
Commerce Clause, to protect information that promotes the progress 
of science and useful arts without making a clear decision to 
supersede the IP Clause’s means because of prevalent commerce 
interests. By contrast, Congress’s protection of other information, 
such as customer lists, is not constitutionally problematic because that 
protection is about promoting commerce, not promoting the progress 
of science and useful arts. 
B. Antibootlegging 
Another provision of doubtful constitutionality is the federal 
antibootlegging provision. In 1994, Congress enacted this provision in 
the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA),316 which implemented 
aspects of a number of multilateral trade agreements, including 
 
 314. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 315. Id. 
 316. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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TRIPS, a treaty concerned with intellectual property.317 The TRIPS 
agreement requires member countries to establish minimum 
standards for copyright, patent, trademark, and other intellectual-
property laws.318 Among these standards is the ability of performers to 
prevent unauthorized “fixation of their unfixed performance and the 
reproduction of such fixation.”319 
Pursuant to TRIPS, Congress implemented the first federal 
antibootlegging protection by enacting the URAA. According to this 
provision, 
[a]nyone who, without the consent of the performer or performers 
involved— 
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical 
performance in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or 
phonorecords of such a performance from an unauthorized 
fixation, 
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the 
sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance, or 
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents 
or offers to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as 
described in paragraph (1), . . . 
shall be subject to the remedies provided in sections 502 through 
505, to the same extent as an infringer of copyright.320 
The remedies mentioned in this provision include injunctions, 
impoundment, and damages.321 The URAA also includes a parallel 
criminal provision authorizing possible fines, a prison term of up to 
ten years, forfeiture, and destruction of the recordings.322 
The criminal provision’s constitutionality has been challenged in 
prosecutions under the provision. Challengers have alleged that 
Congress, in enacting the URAA, impermissibly employed means 
 
 317. See supra text accompanying notes 287–88. 
 318. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 287, pt. II.  
 319. Id. art. 14(1). The earlier Berne Convention permitted countries to provide copyright 
protection to unfixed works but did not require them to do so. Berne Convention, supra note 
289, art. 2, paras. 1–2. The United States acceded to the convention without providing such 
protection. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 320. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006). 
 321. Id. §§ 502–504. 
 322. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006). 
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beyond the limited ones specified in the IP Clause. They have claimed 
both that the law provides protection for performances that are not 
“Writings” and that the protection is perpetual, no durational 
provision having been included in the law.323 Each final court that has 
considered a constitutional challenge has rejected it, reasoning that 
Congress had the authority to enact the law under the Commerce 
Clause, even if the IP Clause does not authorize the means 
employed.324 
This Section argues that in light of the IP Clause’s external 
limitations, these courts were too quick to reject the constitutional 
challenges. 
The structural purpose of the URAA’s antibootlegging provision 
is indubitably the promotion of the progress of science and useful 
arts. For one thing, when Congress enacted this law, it labeled both 
the civil and criminal laws as “[c]opyright [p]rovisions.”325 The Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary that helped craft the implementation of 
TRIPS stated that it was doing so “to safeguard intellectual property 
rights.”326 Congress chose to place the civil provision in Title 17 of the 
U.S. Code with extant copyright law.327 The civil remedies the law 
authorizes are incorporated from existing copyright laws.328 
The antibootlegging provision thus seems to have been enacted 
pursuant to the IP Clause. The civil provision of the Act makes no 
mention of commerce,329 and it was not enacted pursuant to the 
Article II treaty power. Because TRIPS is a congressional-executive 
agreement, the antibootlegging provision therefore must have been 
enacted pursuant to some Article I power, presumably the IP 
 
 323. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Moghadam, 
175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999); KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 
1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 324. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 149–52; Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280; KISS Catalog, 405 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1172–74.  
 325. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. V, subtit. A, 108 Stat. 4809, 
4974 (1994).  
 326. S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 224 (1994); cf. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (“The specific 
context in which [the law] was enacted involved a treaty with foreign nations, called for by the 
World Trade Organization, whose purpose was to ensure uniform recognition and treatment of 
intellectual property in international commerce.”). 
 327. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 512, 108 Stat. at 4974 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)). 
 328. See supra text accompanying notes 320–21. 
 329. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 143. 
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Clause.330 The provision, however, does not comply with the IP 
Clause’s limited means, both because it protects unfixed works and 
because it lacks a durational provision to limit the protection. 
The IP Clause enables Congress to grant exclusive rights to 
authors in their “Writings.”331 Given that the first federal copyright 
law, passed in 1790, provided copyright protection just to books, 
maps, and charts,332 later observers had some difficulty determining 
how broadly the term “Writings” should be construed.333 The 
Supreme Court ruled that the term was not limited strictly to textual 
materials when it decided that a photograph of Oscar Wilde was a 
copyrightable “Writing[].”334 In so doing, the Court construed 
“Writings” beyond the term’s colloquial understanding. It reasoned 
that photographs constitute “Writings” “so far as they are 
representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.”335 
In another case, the Court reasoned more generally that 
“‘Writings’ . . . [are not] construed in their narrow literal sense but, 
rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of 
constitutional principles.”336 In the same decision, the Supreme Court 
held that “recordings of artistic performances” constitute writings, 
even though they are not visually perceptible.337 The Court reasoned 
that recordings are “physical rendering[s] of the fruits of creative 
intellectual or aesthetic labor.”338 Although it did not expressly say so, 
the Court suggested that “Writings” must be physical renderings; by 
implication, performances that are not physically rendered—and thus 
that are not fixed—cannot be “Writings.”339 
 
 330. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 331. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 332. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802). 
 333. Cf. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42, at 2387 (“[P]rotection for maps and charts 
reflects a nonliteral reading of the Copyright Clause.”).  
 334. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56–60 (1884). 
 335. Id. at 58. 
 336. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
 337. Id. at 561–62. 
 338. Id. at 561. 
 339. Cf. id. (“[A]lthough the word ‘writings’ might be limited to script or printed material, it 
may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or 
aesthetic labor.”); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911) (suggesting that “Writings” 
does not include ideas, which are distinct from “the words in which those ideas are clothed”). In 
ruling on whether the term “Writings” embodied a constitutional requirement of originality, the 
Court relayed Congress’s observation that “[t]he two fundamental criteria of copyright 
protection [are] originality and fixation.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
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Most scholars are persuaded that unfixed performances lie 
outside the scope of “Writings.”340 Professor David Nimmer reasons 
that “[i]f the word ‘writings’ is to be given any meaning whatsoever, it 
must, at the very least, denote some material form, capable of 
identification and having a more or less permanent endurance.”341 
Moreover, federal copyright laws, from the earliest to the more 
modern versions, have not protected unfixed works.342 In fact, 
proposals to confer copyright protection on unfixed works have been 
met with staunch criticism that such works are impermissibly 
intangible.343 The consistent decision not to protect unfixed works, 
combined with the term “Writings” in the IP Clause, strongly suggests 
that only fixed works are “Writings.”344 
Fixation can be regarded as an integral prerequisite to copyright 
protection for a number of reasons. First, the benefits society receives 
from artistic works’ being created and eventually moved into the 
public domain are unlikely to happen without fixation. Fixation 
ensures that cultural creations remain available for public use long 
after their creation.345 Second, fixation can help as an evidentiary 
matter by delineating precisely a work’s expression, so that it cannot 
later be disputed in an infringement claim.346 
That said, a minority of scholars think that “Writings” can 
encompass unfixed works. Some reason that once “Writings” is read 
nonliterally, as the Supreme Court has read it, no reason remains to 
 
355 (1991) (second alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); S. REP. 
NO. 94-473, at 50 (1975)).  
 340. E.g., 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 1.08[C][2]; Larissa Mann, If It Ain’t 
Broke . . . Copyright’s Fixation Requirement and Cultural Citizenship, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
201, 202 & n.3 (2011). 
 341. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 1.08[C][2] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 342. See Merschman, supra note 43, at 682 (noting “Congress’s continuous precedent of 
protecting only fixed works for more than two centuries”). 
 343. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, How To Write a Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation and the 
Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 845 (2009) (“[P]roposals [to extend 
copyright protection to the efforts of performers] were met with opposition by, for example, the 
Committee on Copyrights of the American Bar Association based on its ‘attempt to protect 
performing rights of an intangible nature.’” (quoting Everett N. Curtis, Otto F. Barthel, Louis 
Charles Smith & George P. Dike, Report of the Committee on Copyrights, 1937 A.B.A. SEC. 
PAT. TRADE-MARK & COPYRIGHT L. REP. 11, 12–13)). 
 344. See id. at 852 (“If ‘writings’ is interpreted as meaning, at the very least, something in 
tangible form, one might conclude that Congress could not constitutionally extend copyright 
protection to unfixed works . . . .”). 
 345. Merschman, supra note 43, at 663–64. 
 346. See id. at 683 (“[T]he evidentiary role that fixation plays in the copyright system is 
fundamental to preserving the expression/idea dichotomy.”). 
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insist on a distinction between fixed and unfixed works.347 The 
reasoning advanced by Professor Nimmer, however, suggests 
otherwise.348 Others respond that an unfixed performative work 
“clearly is a physical rendering of the fruits of aesthetic labor” 
because it “is capable of being perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated” through a performance.349 That observation is true 
enough, but unfixed performances are unlike the various works the 
Court has found to constitute “Writings,” and the Court has hinted 
that they do not belong to the same class. 
If the majority’s analysis is correct, then live performances—
protected by the antibootlegging provision of the URAA—are not 
“Writings.”350 As such, the antibootlegging provision is not in 
compliance with the IP Clause’s external limitations because it seeks 
to promote the progress of science and useful arts without confining 
itself to the IP Clause’s prescribed means. 
Another reason exists to doubt the law’s constitutionality: it 
lacks a provision limiting the duration of protection.351 Absent a 
court’s reading such a provision into the law, live musical 
performances could be protected eternally from bootlegging. 
Although some commentators suggest that copyright’s durational 
limitation ought to be incorporated into the antibootlegging law,352 
courts have been hesitant to do so.353 
 
 347. See, e.g., 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 17.6.1 (3d ed. 2005) 
(“There is little doubt that the performances subject to protection are ‘writings’ in the 
constitutional sense for, beyond literalism, there is nothing in the mechanical act of fixation to 
distinguish writings from nonwritings.”); Heymann, supra note 343, at 856 (“[T]here is no 
defensible reason to restrict [copyright] protection to fixed works . . . .”). 
 348. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
 349. Leslie Erin Wallis, Comment, The Different Art: Choreography and Copyright, 33 
UCLA L. REV. 1442, 1461, 1466 (1986); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving 
Personality and Reputational Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A 
Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 164 n.100 (citing Wallis, supra, 
at 1461, 1466).  
 350. See generally Dotan Oliar, Resolving Conflicts Among Congress’s Powers Regarding 
Statutes’ Constitutionality: The Case of Anti-Bootlegging Statutes, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 
489–91 (2007) (discussing this view).  
 351. See id. at 491–92 (“The overwhelming majority of courts and commentators suggest 
that the anti-bootlegging statutes violate the limited times requirement.”). 
 352. E.g., Angela T. Howe, United States v. Martignon & KISS Catalog v. Passport 
International Products: The Anti-Bootlegging Statute and the Collision of International 
Intellectual Property Law and the United States Constitution, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 851 
(2005). 
 353. See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274 n.9 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We 
note that the anti-bootlegging statute may be faced with another constitutional problem under 
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Because the antibootlegging provision regulates works that are 
likely not “Writings,” because it lacks any durational limitation, and 
because the structural purpose of the law is to promote the progress 
of science and useful arts, the provision is of dubious constitutionality. 
Moreover, it cannot overcome any presumption against 
constitutionality because there is no clear and convincing evidence 
that Congress intended another legitimate constitutional interest to 
take precedence and thereby supersede the IP Clause’s external 
limitations. The federal government’s attempt to classify this law ex 
post as an exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause354 does nothing to change the fact that the actual and only 
structural purpose reflected in the law is to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts. 
C. Copyright Restoration 
Another law that raises constitutional doubts is the copyright-
restoration provision Congress passed in 1994, also in the URAA.355 
The law restored copyright protection for certain foreign works that 
had fallen into the public domain in the United States—due, among 
other things, to “lack of national eligibility” or “noncompliance with 
formalities imposed at any time by United States copyright law”—but 
whose copyrights had not yet expired in the creators’ home 
countries.356 Included among the works whose copyrights were so 
restored were “films by Alfred Hitchcock and Federico Fellini, books 
by C.S. Lewis and Virginia Woolf, symphonies by Prokofiev and 
Stravinsky and paintings by Picasso.”357 The Berne Convention 
requires copyright restoration,358 but Congress did not comply with 
this requirement when it acceded to Berne in 1989. Then, the TRIPS 
 
the Copyright Clause. . . . [W]e decline to address the argument in light of our disposition of this 
case.”); KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172 n.7 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005) (“Because the United States agreed that the durational limitation of 17 U.S.C. § 302 
cannot be incorporated into the Statute, the Court assumes, without deciding, that it is not 
incorporated.”). 
 354. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 144–45 (2d Cir. 2007); Moghadam, 175 F.3d 
at 1274–75; KISS Catalog, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1172. 
 355. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 504, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81 
(1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109(a) (2006)). 
 356. Id. 
 357. Adam Liptak, Once in the Public’s Hands, Now Back in Picasso’s, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
2011, at A17.  
 358. Berne Convention, supra note 289, art. 18. 
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agreement required signatories to implement this Berne provision.359 
Only when Congress implemented parts of TRIPS did it provide for 
copyright restoration for foreign works. 
In Golan v. Holder,360 this provision was challenged on the 
ground that restoring the copyrights to works that have entered the 
public domain violates the IP Clause’s constraints.361 It was also 
challenged as a violation of the First Amendment,362 an issue I do not 
take up here. The Tenth Circuit rejected the constitutional 
challenge.363 As for the IP Clause, the court reasoned that “the 
decision to comply with the Berne Convention, which secures 
copyright protections for American works abroad, [was not] so 
irrational or so unrelated to the aims of the Copyright Clause that it 
exceed[ed] the reach of congressional power.”364 In a similar, earlier 
challenge to the legislation’s constitutionality, the D.C. Circuit also 
upheld the provision, reasoning that the IP Clause does not limit 
Congress from authorizing protection for material in the public 
domain.365 The Supreme Court agreed with both circuit court rulings 
and upheld Congress’s authority to enact this law pursuant to the IP 
Clause.366 
Congress’s interests in enacting this legislation seemed to be both 
complying with international obligations and promoting the progress 
of science and useful arts. The federal government asserted that it had 
three interests in enacting the law: “(1) attaining indisputable 
compliance with international treaties and multilateral agreements, 
(2) obtaining legal protections for American copyright holders’ 
interests abroad, and (3) remedying past inequities of foreign authors 
who lost or never obtained copyrights in the United States.”367 The 
 
 359. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 287, art. 9(1). 
 360. Golan v. Holder (Golan III), 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 361. See id. at 878 (“Petitioners . . . . maintain that [under] the Constitution’s Copyright and 
Patent Clause, . . . . a work that has entered the public domain, for whatever reason, must 
forever remain there.”). 
 362. Id. 
 363. Golan v. Holder (Golan II), 609 F.3d 1076, 1094 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 
(2012); Golan v. Gonzales (Golan I), 501 F.3d 1179, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2007).  
 364. Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1187. 
 365. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1263–65 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 366. Golan III, 132 S. Ct. at 889. 
 367. Golan II, 609 F.3d at 1083. The Supreme Court accepted the first reason—maintaining 
good foreign relations—by pointing to the Mexican, Thai, Russian, and other criticism of the 
United States’ prior inaction to restore copyrights as Congress later did and an American desire 
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first interest was compliance with international obligations, whereas 
the next two were promoting the progress of science and useful arts: 
the former by giving greater incentive to American authors to create 
and the latter by giving an incentive to foreign authors to develop and 
market their works. 
Because Congress passed the law to comply with TRIPS, one 
might suggest that it was thus using an Article I power—presumably 
the IP Clause—as its source of authority for implementing a 
congressional-executive agreement. Yet the story is more complicated 
than that because TRIPS required the United States to comply with 
the Berne Convention on copyright restoration.368 The United States 
acceded to Berne pursuant to its Article II treatymaking power.369 
Therefore, as an alternative to legislating under the IP Clause, by 
implementing copyright restoration pursuant to TRIPS, Congress 
may have been using the Necessary and Proper Clause.370 As 
discussed in Part II.B.4, although a case might be made that Article II 
treaties, particularly non-self-executing ones, need to comply with the 
IP Clause’s external limitations, one could mount a respectable 
argument that they do not.371 
To the extent that the IP Clause limits the means that Congress 
may employ in this context, Congress’s passage of the copyright-
restoration provision within the URAA might seem to exceed the 
means authorized by the Clause. In fact, the law’s challengers argue 
that extending copyright restoration to works already in the public 
domain violates the IP Clause’s “limited Times” restriction.372 These 
challengers assert that once a work has moved into the public domain, 
its limited time of protection is at an end and cannot be restored.373 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, effectively 
reasoning that a one-time restoration of copyrights to some works for 
 
to avoid a trade-enforcement proceeding in the World Trade Organization on that basis. Golan 
III, 132 S. Ct. at 880–82. 
 368. See supra text accompanying note 359. 
 369. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 370. This argument is weakened by Congress’s 1988 statements that the legislature did not 
need to implement copyright restoration to comply with the Berne Convention. See THE 
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 323, 
reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 656, 992 (1994) (“Before the United States adhered to 
the Berne Convention in 1989, Congress determined that the United States was in compliance 
with Article 18 of the Convention . . . .”).  
 371. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 372. E.g., Golan I, 501 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 373. Golan III, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012). 
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a finite time is well within Congress’s power to confer rights in 
intellectual property for limited times.374 
By interpreting the “limited Times” provision as it did,375 the 
Supreme Court avoided—and perhaps consciously ducked—having to 
address whether and how the IP Clause’s external limitations tie 
Congress’s hands and prevent it from restoring copyright protection 
to works that have already fallen into the public domain. 
D. Database Protection 
Legislation involving database protection is another area of 
statutory law that raises constitutional uncertainty. As of 2012, 
Congress had not yet passed into law any such protection, but many 
bills had been introduced on the topic in the preceding years. In 1991, 
the Supreme Court cast doubt on the possibility of using copyright 
law broadly to protect information databases. The Court ruled that 
databases constitutionally fall within the purview of the copyright 
laws only when the database compiler for whom the protection is 
intended “chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them, 
and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used 
effectively by readers . . . . so long as [the choices] are made 
independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of 
creativity.”376 Absent such conditions, protection for databases 
 
 374. Id. at 884. 
 375. Another possible interpretation of the provision was colorable. The historical evidence 
on the precise definition of “limited Times” in this context is scant, Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1190–
91, and before Golan III, the Supreme Court had not ruled on it. It had stated in other contexts, 
however, that the precise point of copyright and patent laws enacted pursuant to the IP Clause 
is to ensure that the protected works will fall into the public domain for others to use freely. 
E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 
5–6 (1966). Moreover, in preemption decisions analyzing whether states could protect works 
that had fallen into the public domain, the Court had reasoned that “that which is in the public 
domain cannot be removed therefrom by action of the States.” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); accord Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 
237 (1964) (“[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not 
forbid others to copy that article.”). Implied in this reasoning was the notion that part and 
parcel of the authority to grant exclusive rights for limited times is a concurrent lack of authority 
to regulate once that time has expired. For a related discussion of former Professor Patry’s 
argument that the IP Clause contains both positive and negative rights, see supra text 
accompanying notes 180–83. 
 376. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). 
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transgresses the “Authors” and “Writings” requirements of the IP 
Clause.377 
After this decision, Congress proposed various bills to protect 
databases more comprehensively, although none of them passed into 
law.378 Those bills relied on the Commerce Clause for their authority379 
because the IP Clause had been ruled off-limits for noncreative 
databases. The remaining question is whether even that reliance on 
the Commerce Clause was permissible in light of the IP Clause’s 
external limitations. 
Scholarship on the constitutional question is divided. For 
example, Professors Heald and Sherry think that legislation 
protecting databases is constitutionally problematic because “facts 
have historically been considered to form a critical part of the public 
domain, available for anyone to use.”380 Professor Pollack, however, 
thinks that database protection is constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause as long as it is limited to cases of market failure.381 
Much of this debate implicitly centers on whether the structural 
purpose of database-protection laws is promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts or fostering interstate commerce. If their 
purpose is only the former, the laws must comply with the IP Clause’s 
 
 377. See id. at 346 (explaining that the Supreme Court has “made it unmistakably clear” that 
“the crucial terms ‘authors’ and ‘writings’” both “presuppose a degree of originality”). But cf. 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of 
Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1867 (1990) (using history to show that early copyright 
law protected “works of little personal authorship yet considerable expenditure of labor and 
capital”). 
 378. See, e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 
108th Cong. (2003) (proposing the “prohibit[ion of] the misappropriation of certain databases”); 
Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. 
(1996) (proposing a statutory amendment “to promote investment and prevent intellectual 
property piracy with respect to databases”). See generally Samuel E. Trosow, Sui Generis 
Database Legislation: A Critical Analysis, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 534, 573–625 (2005) (reviewing 
various unsuccessful proposals for “sui generis database legislation” that have come up before 
“the U.S. Congress and at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)”). 
 379. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-349, pt. 1, at 16 (1999). 
 380. Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1177–78; see also Patry, supra note 17, at 394–97 
(criticizing a bill for effectively providing a property right in databases without requiring 
originality, “any real effort or systematic organization,” or “investment of substantial monetary 
resources”). 
 381. See Pollack, supra note 15, at 61 (“Market failure . . . might be sufficient reason to allow 
the Commerce Clause to ground time-limited protection for an unoriginal work because market 
failure allows a well-grounded conclusion that Congress is not doing an end run around the 
Intellectual Property Clause—both in the sense of Congress’ intent and in the sense that the 
result is unlikely to harm the avowed purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause, the progress 
of science and useful arts.”). 
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means, meaning no protection can be extended for databases that are 
insufficiently original. If their purpose is just the latter, however, then 
Congress has a wide berth to legislate to protect databases. Moreover, 
if the laws have both purposes, Congress may constitutionally enact 
them only if it sets out clear and convincing evidence that commercial 
interests dictate superseding the IP Clause’s external limitations, a 
requirement that will be very difficult to satisfy if the laws subvert the 
IP Clause’s means rather than merely supplementing them. Overall, 
which structural purpose is at issue in any given piece of legislation 
depends heavily on the legislation’s particulars. For example, if a 
database-protection law were to prohibit only business competitors 
from extracting information from a database without authorization, 
that fact would suggest that the law was occupied with promoting 
commerce by encouraging investment in database development.382 By 
contrast, the same inference would be absent if the law were to 
prevent anyone from extracting information, even for noncompetitive 
purposes; in that case, the law would be less about promoting 
commerce and more about promoting the progress of science and 
useful arts.383 Similarly, one could make the case that a law protecting 
people who put a substantial investment into creating any sort of 
database—not just people who make a creative or technical 
contribution—is less interested in promoting the progress of science 
and useful arts than in encouraging commerce.384 Whatever the 
outcome, the framework for evaluating the IP Clause’s external 
limitations crisply queues up the issues that must be answered. 
E. Federal Funding of Artistic and Scientific Works 
Possibly the most prominent category of federal action that 
raises constitutional concerns in light of the IP Clause’s external 
limitations is federal funding of artistic and scientific works. As this 
Section shows, this practice seems to be constitutionally proper, if not 
 
 382. Cf. Benkler, supra note 16, at 597 (arguing that “[i]f in fact the important governmental 
interest is to prevent undercutting of database producers by competitors who provide the same 
product without paying the cost of its development,” then a provision that would extend beyond 
“competition among producers of the same product” to affect “producers of different products 
to the extent that one product is an improvement of, or uses as an input some of, the other 
product” would be “unnecessarily broad”). 
 383. See id. at 596–97 (observing that if a particular bill “aims to prohibit use by users who 
are not competitors, then the law is not an unfair competition law, but a property right, which 
cannot be passed outside the Intellectual Property Clause”). 
 384. E.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 51, 54–55 (1997).  
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because of the Spending Clause, then because of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. 
General federal funding of the arts is of relatively modern 
vintage. In the nation’s early years, few observers agreed that 
government ought to play a role in funding art; private parties funded 
it instead.385 In the early twentieth century, the federal government 
occasionally funded art, not to support art itself but out of broader 
economic concerns, such as the desire to create employment through 
Works Progress Administration programs.386 In 1965, federal funding 
of the arts was made systematic when Congress instituted the 
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities “to develop and 
promote a broadly conceived national policy of support for the 
humanities and the arts in the United States.”387 The foundation was 
authorized to provide grants for artistic and literary works and for 
education in the arts and humanities.388 The material motivations for 
this funding were the centrality of arts and humanities to American 
citizens and the necessity “for the Federal Government to help create 
and sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought, 
imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions facilitating 
the release of this creative talent.”389 By 1998, the foundation—now 
known as the National Endowment for the Arts—had distributed 
over $3 billion in grants.390 
Like federal support for the arts, general federal funding of 
scientific and technological research became systematic in the mid-
twentieth century. Before that, the federal government would 
sometimes fund nonmedical research during wartime to develop 
military technologies, as it did with World War II’s Manhattan 
 
 385. Note, Standards for Federal Funding of the Arts: Free Expression and Political Control, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1970 (1990). 
 386. Id. Similarly, the Central Intelligence Agency secretly funded and promoted American 
modern art in an attempt to establish preeminence over the Soviet Union. Frances Stonor 
Saunders, Modern Art Was CIA ‘Weapon,’ INDEPENDENT (Oct. 22, 1995), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/modern-art-was-cia-weapon-1578808.html. These funding 
activities were not in the service of promoting the progress of science and useful arts; as such, 
they were outside the purview of the IP Clause’s external limitations.  
 387. National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209, 
§ 4(a)–(b), 79 Stat. 845, 846 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 953(a)–(b) (2006)).  
 388. Id. §§ 5–11, 79 Stat. at 846–54 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 954–960). 
 389. Id. § 2, 79 Stat. at 845 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 951).  
 390. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 574 (1998). 
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Project.391 Even though this research would often trickle down to 
public uses, the funding was initiated to support the federal 
government’s military function.392 Vannevar Bush, who was involved 
in the Manhattan Project, proposed that the government begin 
funding, through a federal agency, scientific research done by 
universities and other research centers during peacetime.393 As a 
result, in 1950, Congress created the National Science Foundation 
(NSF).394 Among the goals established for the NSF by Congress were 
“to initiate and support basic scientific [and engineering] research and 
programs to strengthen scientific [and engineering] research potential 
and . . . education programs” and “to foster the interchange of 
scientific and engineering information among scientists and engineers 
in the United States and foreign countries.”395 Moreover, Congress 
articulated that it was founding the NSF because “the Nation’s 
capacity to conduct high quality research and education programs and 
to maintain its competitive position at the forefront of modern 
science, engineering, and technology [was being] threatened by [a] 
research capital deficit.”396 As of 2010, the NSF was funding about half 
of colleges’ and universities’ basic nonmedical-research activities.397 
The federal government has a longer history of funding medical 
research. In 1878, Congress appropriated funds for “investigating the 
origin and causes of epidemic diseases, especially yellow fever and 
cholera.”398 The next year, Congress created the National Board of 
Health, the federal government’s first general and organized funder 
 
 391. See generally THE MANHATTAN PROJECT (Cynthia C. Kelly ed., 2009) (compiling 
accounts of the Manhattan Project, from its genesis through its aftermath).  
 392. Other funding for military technology provided earlier in the United States’ history, 
such as funding for the appointment of teachers of arts and sciences for military instruction, 
Sidney Forman, Why the United States Military Academy Was Established in 1802, 29 MILITARY 
AFF. 16, 22 (1965), similarly had no material structural purpose of promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts.  
 393. Jeffrey A. Hart, Organizational Cultures in U.S. Research-Oriented Universities, in 
ADAPTING UNIVERSITIES TO THE GLOBAL SOCIETY—A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 143, 
143–44 (Charles F. Bonser ed., 2009).  
 394. National Science Foundation Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-507, § 2, 64 Stat. 149, 149 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006)). 
 395. 42 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(1), (3) (2006).  
 396. Id. § 1862a(a)(3).  
 397. Eve Heafey, Public Access to Science: The New Policy of the National Institutes of 
Health in Light of Copyright Protections in National and International Law, 14 UCLA J.L. & 
TECH., no. 2, 2010, at 1, 46.  
 398. Act of Dec. 21, 1878, Res. No. 2, 20 Stat. 487. 
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of medical research.399 Having since changed its name to the National 
Institutes of Health, the agency provides funding for a wide variety of 
medical research,400 approximating $31.2 billion annually.401 
Funding for scientific and technological research also comes 
through the military—for example, through the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency.402 This funding is concerned with 
developing technologies to promote national security.403 
When otherwise-copyrightable works are produced pursuant to 
these grants, the copyright law does not speak expressly about 
whether such works are copyrightable. The legislative history to the 
1976 revision of the Copyright Act, however, states that either 
Congress or the agency responsible for the funding may decide 
whether to allow the funded party to secure copyright in the funded 
works.404 Nonetheless, one commentator points to a federal policy 
“favoring broad copyrightability in federally supported works.”405 
Following federal grants in both arts and sciences, the government 
typically allows the grantee to copyright resulting work—including 
articles discussing research—with the government reserving a royalty-
free, nonexclusive license.406 
 
 399. Id. 
 400. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 241, 282 (2006) (empowering the director of the National Institutes of 
Health to undertake research activities). 
 401. NIH Budget, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2012). 
 402. See generally History, DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, http://www.
darpa.mil/About/History/History.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (providing a brief overview of 
the history of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and including links to further 
information).  
 403. See Our Work, DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, http://www.darpa.
mil/our_work (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (“The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) was established in 1958 to prevent strategic surprise from negatively impacting U.S. 
national security and create strategic surprise for U.S. adversaries by maintaining the 
technological superiority of the U.S. military.”). 
 404. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 59 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5672. 
Opponents of copyright protection maintain that it is a “double subsidy” atop the funding that 
spurred the creation, whereas proponents argue that it is an important incentive to funded 
works’ “creation and dissemination.” E.g., id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally 
Samuel E. Trosow, Copyright Protection for Federally Funded Research: Necessary Incentive or 
Double Subsidy?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 613, 648–71 (2004) (summarizing “the initial 
reactions . . . from the various stakeholders” to a bill proposed by Representative Martin Olav 
Sabo in 2003 that would have amended the copyright rules applicable to federally funded 
works). 
 405. Trosow, supra note 404, at 621–22. 
 406. E.g., Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements with 
Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations (OMB 
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Since 1980, patent law has similarly allowed nonprofit, university, 
and small-business grantees to patent inventions resulting from 
federal grants after the inventors have complied with various 
formalities.407 Before this scheme was implemented, the federal 
government would typically own the rights to these inventions and 
would either commit them to the public domain or freely license 
resulting patents nonexclusively to interested parties.408 
Could this extensive funding of artistic and scientific works be 
unconstitutional in light of the IP Clause’s external limitations? 
Recall that the Founders rejected just this sort of funding as a means 
of promoting the progress of science and useful arts,409 and the First 
Congress was worried about its constitutional ability to fund scientific 
research.410 Nonetheless, even if the Spending Clause does not permit 
this funding, the Necessary and Proper Clause likely does. 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has rejected the notion that such 
funding is unconstitutional.411 In an analysis directly contrary to this 
Article’s reasoning, that court has reasoned that 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 does not state that the Government may promote the 
progress of the useful arts only through the patent and copyright 
system. Ample constitutional power for Government funding of 
research and development can be found in art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (provide 
for the common Defense and general Welfare), cl. 3 (Commerce), cl. 
12 (Army), cl. 13 (Navy) and cl. 18 (necessary and proper clause).412 
 
Circular A-110), 2 C.F.R. § 215.36 (2011); NAT’L SCI. FOUND., NSF GRANT POLICY MANUAL, 
at VII-16 to -17 (2005), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/manuals/gpm05_131/gpm05_131
.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH GRANTS POLICY STATEMENT, at IIA-85 
to -87 (2011), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2011/nihgps_2011.pdf.  
 407. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, sec. 6, § 202, 94 Stat. 3015, 3020 (1980) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2006)). 
 408. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663 (1996) 
(“[L]egislation [prior to a pair of statutes passed in 1980] had typically encouraged or required 
that federal agencies sponsoring research make the results widely available to the public 
through government ownership or dedication to the public domain.”). The law was changed to 
improve the dissemination of inventions resulting from funded research by providing a greater 
incentive to commercialize. S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 3 (1979).  
 409. See supra Part I.B.1.  
 410. See supra text accompanying notes 116–27. 
 411. Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 412. Id. 
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The court then concluded that federal funding for research and 
development also falls within the Spending Clause’s purview.413 
Yet as this Article maintains, the text, structure, history, judicial 
doctrine, and policy surrounding the IP Clause yield a plausible 
argument that the Spending Clause is in fact limited externally by the 
IP Clause.414 If that argument is correct, then federal funding of 
artistic and scientific works—which is done to promote the progress 
of science and useful arts—would seem to be impermissible because it 
falls outside of the IP Clause’s limited means. At the same time, 
however, given how expansively the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Spending Clause,415 the Court very well might not allow the IP 
Clause to limit Congress’s spending power. 
In any event, federal funding of artistic and scientific works, as 
typically structured, is almost certainly constitutionally authorized by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. As I analyze in Part II.B.3, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts through means other than those 
specified in the IP Clause, but only to support the Clause’s means for 
the specified end.416 Accordingly, as conventionally structured, federal 
funding of artistic and scientific works seeks to promote the progress 
of science and useful arts so as to secure exclusive rights to authors 
and inventors for limited times in their works. It does so by providing 
funding to authors and inventors to create their works in the first 
place and by enabling them generally—although not requiring 
them—to seek copyright and patent protection in those works as 
further incentive to create and disseminate them.417 That congruency 
 
 413. Id. 
 414. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 415. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 416. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 417. I do not mean to say that any and all means not enabled by the IP Clause can be 
enacted pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause. Some means are too tenuously related to 
the IP Clause’s means and ends to qualify. For example, something maintained as a trade secret 
cannot be patented. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006) (disallowing an inventor a patent when 
“another inventor . . . establishes . . . that before [the filing person’s] invention thereof the 
invention was made by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed” 
(emphasis added)); Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1038–39 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“Even though there is no explicit disclosure requirement in § 102(g), the spirit and policy of the 
patent laws encourage an inventor to take steps to ensure that ‘the public has gained knowledge 
of the invention which will insure its preservation in the public domain’ or else run the risk of 
being dominated by the patent of another.” (quoting Palmer v. Dudzik, 481 F.2d 1377, 1387 
(C.C.P.A. 1973))). Because a trade secret cannot lead to a patent except in a tenuous way, 
FROMER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2012  8:25 PM 
2012] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 1413 
between the IP Clause’s means and ends is as much as the Necessary 
and Proper Clause requires; by maintaining that congruency, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause enables a law that is “‘convenient, or 
useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the [underlying] authority’s ‘beneficial 
exercise.’”418 In fact, federal funding for scientific works was perhaps 
more constitutionally problematic before 1980, when rights to 
research vested in the federal government, not in inventors. When 
that vesting occurred, the funding was not promoting exclusive rights 
to inventors, as the Necessary and Proper Clause seems to require 
when constrained by the IP Clause’s external limitations. 
In sum, the vast practice of federal funding of artistic and 
scientific works, as commonly structured, seems to lie well within 
Congress’s authority. 
*          *          * 
As this Part shows, the constitutionality of a number of federal 
laws is left in doubt by the IP Clause’s external limitations, 
particularly the federal trade-secrecy and antibootlegging laws. By 
contrast, federal funding of artistic and scientific works is likely 
constitutional. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
IP Clause in upholding the copyright-restoration laws obviated any 
clash between the IP Clause and other constitutional sources of 
congressional authority. Even when the analytical framework 
proposed herein does not yield an obvious, clear-cut answer as to a 
law’s constitutionality, as it does with the proposed database-
protection legislation, the framework still sharpens and focuses the 
issues to be resolved. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article relies on the text, structure, and history of the IP 
Clause, as well as subsequent governmental activity, Supreme Court 
doctrine, and policy, to show that the IP Clause operates to forbid 
Congress from using its other powers “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts” through laws that reach beyond the scope of 
the IP Clause’s prescription to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors 
 
protection of trade secrecy, see supra Part III.A, cannot be proper under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  
 418. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413, 418 (1819)). 
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and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” This evidence shows that if Congress seeks, via 
legislation, to promote the progress of science and useful arts, the 
only way it can do so is by enacting laws that secure to authors and 
inventors exclusive rights in their writings and discoveries for limited 
times. This Article provides an analytical framework under which 
courts, legislators, and others could assess the constitutionality of 
federal legislation. If the structural purpose of a law is to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, the law may use only the means 
specified in the IP Clause to pursue that purpose. This understanding 
of external limitations imposed by the IP Clause yields varying 
collisions with other constitutional provisions, primarily the 
Commerce, Spending, and Necessary and Proper Clauses and the 
treaty powers. To evaluate laws that have multiple constitutional 
purposes, a presumption ought to exist against the constitutionality of 
laws that promote the IP Clause’s ends but subvert its means, a 
presumption that may be overcome only by clear and convincing 
evidence that Congress intentionally chose to supersede the IP 
Clause’s means because of paramount, legitimate interests pursuant 
to its other more permissive powers. This presumption ought to be 
extremely difficult to overcome when a law’s means interfere with the 
IP Clause’s means instead of merely diverging from the means 
included in the IP Clause. This Article’s framework suggests that a 
number of existing federal laws, such as federal trade-secrecy 
provisions and antibootlegging laws, might be unconstitutional. The 
framework also suggests how to assess the constitutionality of laws 
that would protect databases, laws passed pursuant to international 
agreements, and federal funding for scientific and artistic works. 
